Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy

14 Paths to the Future: Scenarios and Prescriptions

14 Paths to the Future Scenarios and Prescriptions 1. introduction Astudy of this sort cannot be concluded without discussing the implications of its key ‹ndings. One question arising out of the discussion of the problems in Israel’s security and foreign policy is, What next? For example, what happens if the trends we have detailed in the present study continue uninterrupted? How can these trends change by forces beyond Israel’s control? How can they be changed if Israelis are willing to learn from their mistakes, not to repeat them but to correct them? This chapter concludes the study by delineating four possible futures in the Middle East. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Elements from one scenario may be present in another. Nor are these scenarios exhaustive; there are other scenarios or combinations of the various scenarios that are as plausible as the ones I discuss here. Readers should regard these scenarios more as frameworks for analyzing and prescribing policies than as forecasts of alternative futures. The purpose of introducing these scenarios is threefold. First, I examine various extrapolations of the general trends and issues I discussed in the previous chapters. Second, I wish to examine how alternative Israeli behaviors and organization of its foreign and security policy may affect each of these scenarios and how Israel’s situation might be affected by these scenarios. Third, I wish to use these scenarios to provide some policy prescriptions for Israel. Accordingly, this chapter is organized as fol597 lows. In sections 2–5, I outline the scenarios. I also examine how Israeli national security and foreign policy may affect the emergence of the speci‹c scenario and how it may be affected by the elements entailed in it. Section 6 discusses ways in which fundamental reforms in Israeli policy may help determine the relative likelihood of the various scenarios, increasing the prospects of desired scenarios and reducing the probability of undesired ones. I conclude this book by examining some issues that have not been adequately covered and by offering paths to future research. A methodological note is in order before we go into a discussion of the various scenarios. The starting point of each scenario is the near present. The basic circumstances are the following: 1. Israel has contractual peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. These treaties, while marking a fairly cold peace, are nevertheless stable and have withstood several tests, such as the Lebanon War and four years of the Al Aqsa Intifada (Maoz 2004c). 2. Israeli-Syrian relations are tense. There is no open warfare, but peace negotiations have not resumed. Israel accuses Syria of supporting Hizballah and harboring Palestinian terrorist organizations. Syria is engaged in ‹erce anti-Israel rhetoric. 3. There are infrequent—and limited—clashes between Israel and Hizballah, mostly due to Israeli over›ights in Lebanon. Occasionally, Hizballah ‹res at Israeli positions in the disputed Shab’ah area and Israel responds by shelling Hizballah positions in southern Lebanon, but the confrontation is mostly limited to a war of words. 4. The Israeli-Palestinian con›ict—the Al Aqsa Intifada—is still ongoing without any sign of negotiations between the parties. 5. The United States continues to be the dominant superpower in world politics, but there are several political challenges to its Middle East policy from the international community, including from some of its closest allies. 6. The United States is deeply involved in Iraq, continuing to suffer casualties due to insurgency emanating from various factions within the country. 7. The threat of global terrorism continues to impose considerable constraints on the relations between the United States and various Middle East states, such as Syria, Iran, and the Palestinians. 8. Israel and the United States suspect that Iran is pursuing a nuclear 598 DEFENDING THE HOLY LAND weapons program in de‹ance of the IAEA and the international community . Diplomatically, however, Iran denies these charges but plays a cat and mouse game with IAEA regarding the second protocol of the NPT, which allows surprise inspections of nuclear sites. 9. The Israeli government and security community are unchanged. The security community continues to dominate policy-making, while other elements of the bureaucracy and the political system continue to play a minor role in the process. The Israeli public is still divided on the question of the occupied territories but generally supports government policy with respect to the management of the intifada. Elements in the Israeli political...