Memory’s Turn: Reckoning with Dictatorship in Brazil

Notes

131  Notes Intro­ duc­ tion 1. Of­ fi­ cially, the CNV is ­ charged with in­ ves­ ti­ gat­ ing human ­ rights vi­ o­ la­ tions com­ mit­ ted after 1946 but be­ fore 1988. This ­ broader time frame was de­ signed to pla­ cate crit­ ics, es­ pe­ cially those from ­ within the mil­ i­ tary. In prac­ tice, how­ ever, the CNV has inter­ preted its man­ date more nar­ rowly by fo­ cus­ ing on ­ crimes com­ mit­ ted after the coup of April 1, 1964. 2. A de­ bate with the film­ maker, co­ stars, and screen­ writer was held the fol­ low­ ing day. 3. The Cham­ ber of Dep­ u­ ties ­ passed the bill on Sep­ tem­ ber 21, a week be­ fore the­ film’s pre­ miere. 4. L. Lima, “Ci­ neasta Tata Am­ aral traz ao fes­ ti­ val”; Ta­ vares, “‘Hoje,’ de Tata Am­ aral”; and L. Lima, “Atores de Hoje de­ fen­ dem.” 5. The goal of sen­ si­ tiz­ ing the pub­ lic dis­ tin­ guishes the ob­ jec­ tives of the CNV from those of the ear­ lier Law of the Dis­ ap­ peared, which ­ treated po­ lit­ i­ cal ­ deaths and dis­ ap­ pear­ ances as a ques­ tion to be resolved pri­ vately ­ between the state and in­ di­ vid­ ual fam­ i­ lies­ through the pay­ ment of fi­ nan­ cial rep­ ar­ a­ tions. 6. Dir­ e­ toria do GTNM/RJ, “A ­ Comissão da Ver­ dade.” 7. Leal, “Tata Am­ aral.” Here and through­ out, all trans­ la­ tions from the Por­ tu­ guese (and from the Span­ ish, as such occur) are my own un­ less oth­ er­ wise noted. 8. “‘Hoje,’ de Tata Am­ aral,” and Car­ neiro, “As con­ se­ quên­ cias da dit­ a­ dura.” 9. Steve J. Stern ­ writes of the abil­ ity of ex­ cep­ tional crea­ tive works to em­ body and­ strengthen a cul­ tural mo­ ment or an emerg­ ing sen­ sibil­ ity in his dis­ cus­ sion of the Chi­ lean film Ma­ chuca. See Stern, Reck­ on­ ing with Pi­ no­ chet, 311. 10. In Bra­ zil, the sec­ ond of the two na­ tional rep­ ar­ a­ tions in­ itia­ tives, known as the Am­ nesty Com­ mis­ sion, in­ cludes a pro­ gram ­ called “Mar­ cas da ­ Memória” (Marks of Mem­ ory) that fos­ ters ­ artistic-cultural pro­ duc­ tion re­ lated to the mil­ i­ tary dic­ tat­ or­ ship and its leg­ a­ cies. Wid­ en­ ing the scope to Latin Amer­ ica, Peru of­ fers an ex­ cel­ lent ex­ am­ ple of how truth com­ mis­ sions can fos­ ter cul­ tural pro­ duc­ tion. See Mil­ ton, “At the Edge.”  132 N o t e s t o p a g e s 8 – 1 0 11. On Ar­ gen­ tina, see, for ex­ am­ ple, Tay­ lor, Dis­ ap­ pear­ ing Acts, and Tay­ lor, ­ Archive and the Rep­ er­ toire. On Chile, see Stern, Reck­ on­ ing with Pi­ no­ chet; Laz­ zara, Chile in Tran­ si­ tion; and ­ Gómez-Barris, Where Mem­ ory ­ Dwells. On Peru, see Mil­ ton, intro­ duc­ tion to Art from a Frac­ tured Past. 12. Sik­ kink, Jus­ tice Cas­ cade, 150. 13. Sec­ tors that ­ called for the coup and sup­ ported the dic­ tat­ or­ ship, at least in­ itially, in­ cluded the busi­ ness and po­ lit­ i­ cal elite, the ­ church, and wide ­ swaths of the mid­ dle class. 14. ­ Schwarz, “Cul­ ture and Pol­ i­ tics in Bra­ zil,” 127. 15. To carry out this po­ lit­ i­ cal vi­ o­ lence, the re­ gime ­ relied on a vast net­ work of mil­ i­ tary and po­ lice agen­ cies that in­ cluded the in­ tel­ li­ gence ser­ vices of the army (CIE), navy (CEN­ I­ MAR), and air force (CISA) as well as the var­ i­ ous state ­ branches of the po­ lit­ i­ cal po­ lice (De­ par­ ta­ mento Es­ tad­ ual de Ordem ­ Política e So­ cial, DEOPS). A joint­ military-police com­ mand unit (OBAN, later re­ named ­ DOI-CODI) co­ or­ di­ nated the ac­ tiv­ i­ ties of the se­ cur­ ity ­ forces. To­ gether, these agen­ cies com­ posed what Mar­ tha Hug­ gins and her col­ leagues call the mil­ i­ tary ­ dictatorship’s “as­ sem­ bly line of...