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I nitially, pro-Treatyites were so concerned by the internal split with republicans that foreign affairs took a back seat. Cosgrave told a cabinet meeting in June 1922 that “our foreign affairs, other than commercial , would be a matter of no importance.”1 Earlier that year, Collins had told Lloyd George that he was not terribly interested in external affairs, as Ireland had sufficient work to do in getting its own affairs settled.2 Presumably , Cosgrave and Collins each exempted Anglo-Irish affairs from their comments, as it would be difficult to imagine that subject being put on a back burner at any stage of the Free State’s development. Nevertheless, the desire to neglect foreign affairs continually arose in the early years of the Free State, and there was significant criticism in the Dáil of the existence of a Ministry for External Affairs, often from the budget-conscious Farmers ’ Party. Farmers’ Deputy Heffernan proposed in late 1923 to merge the Department of External Affairs with the President’s Department. This was primarily to effect financial savings, but Heffernan also noted, “We should concentrate on internal rather than external affairs, and that, except on matters arising out of our trade relations, it is rather inadvisable that we should devote so much attention and place too much emphasis on our connection with outside countries as to establish and maintain a separate Ministry for that purpose.” Denis Gorey, the leader of the Farmers’ Party, said, “Outside the Dáil, and amongst the plain men of the street, it [External Affairs] will be known as a Ministry of very little utility and a Ministry purely for finding jobs for somebody.” In response, Minister of External Affairs Desmond FitzGerald said, “I daresay there are people who wish to go back to 177 5 A Dominion in Name the status or lack of status implied by the Home Rule Bill of 1914. This is now a sovereign nation, and it has to do with other countries. We cannot separate ourselves from other countries, and if we were utterly cut off from other countries, Deputy Gorey and the party he represents would be the first people to suffer.”3 The amendment to extinguish a separate external affairs department only lost 49–27, one of the closer votes in a Dáil stripped of its major opposition party. Irish diplomacy developed in the 1920s in an atmosphere of indifference or hostility to the concept of foreign affairs, a lingering suspicion of the nature of the Anglo-Irish relationship under the Treaty, and a class-tinged contempt for lavish diplomatic receptions and conferences. Nevertheless, the Cumann na nGaedheal government did stake out an often aggressive foreign policy that maximized Ireland’s sovereignty and expanded its visibility abroad. The Cumann na nGaedheal government used a number of strategies to pursue its foreign policy goals during the 1920s. The first was the continued use of arguments from similarity and difference. Irish statesmen remained concerned with asserting Irish uniqueness, or at least asserting policies stemming from Ireland’s particular geographic position. Second, as Michael Kennedy has pointed out, Irish diplomacy worked on three interrelated stages: bilateral Anglo-Irish relations, the British Commonwealth, and non-Commonwealth nations, with which the Irish usually interacted through the medium of the League of Nations. Despite interest in the League, Irish diplomacy remained primarily focused on the relationship with Great Britain, and more often than not used the League and the commonwealth as a way of increasing or making more evident Irish independence from Britain. Finally, Cumann na nGaedheal diplomats and statesmen exploited a certain tension between precision and ambiguity in conducting foreign relations, particularly Anglo-Irish relations. Despite the fact that the AngloIrish relationship was now governed by a formal agreement for the first time since the Act of Union, it soon became clear that the Treaty was a more flexible and ambiguous document than perhaps intended. The Free Staters realized rather quickly that they could exploit the unwritten rules of the commonwealth , as well as the slippery language of the Treaty, in order to extend Irish sovereignty. Ambiguity had always helped Irish nationalists appeal to a broad Irish spectrum. As noted in a Department of Justice memo from 1929, after the Treaty both British and Irish leaders “had to conciliate angry and excited followers. In this frame of mind vague and ambiguous language which could do no practical harm was used to cover the points upon which 178 A Dominion in Name immediate...

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