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4. Loyal Enemies
- University of Wisconsin Press
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117 4 Loyal Enemies If believers in heterodox faiths [inovertsy], of whatever creed, or a Russian, casts abuse on the Lord God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, or on the Lady Most Pure Who gave birth to Him, our Mother of God the Chaste Maiden Mary, or on the Holy Cross, or on His Holy Saints: rigorously investigate this by all methods of inquiry. If that is established conclusively; having convicted the blasphemer, execute him by burning him. Richard Hellie, The Ulozhenie of 1649, chap. 1, art. 1 Very true the saying is, “Scratch the Russian and find the Tartar.” James Gallatin, A Great Peacemaker, 2 January 1823 During the first one hundred years following the defeat of Kazan, Russian plans for the frontier emphasized the establishment of steppe and internal security. Yet even after 1650, internal resistance to tsarist authority, however nominal, and potential raids by nearby nomads tested Russian resilience. Turkic groups threatened both sides of the newly defined border (the Arzamas Line and the later Simbirsk Line). Although some Turkic groups remained animist, Russian administrators between Kazan and the southernmost frontier continually feared a Muslim-Turkic conspiracy supported by the Ottoman Empire. While the two defensive lines aided Russian pacification efforts within the tsarist portion of these lands, they were never as effective as intended. Nomadic raids remained troublesome, and nothing allayed Muscovite fears of a potential Ottoman or Crimean invasion. The tsar and his government, therefore, relied on a strong cavalry force to defend the frontier, supported by land grants ( pomest’ia; sing. pomest’e). This was in fact nearly the same military-supply system that had been used by the khanate, and the readiest supply of “new” troops for the tsar was Kazan’s Tatar elite.1 These Tatars would retain their traditional estates and peasants as long as they provided military service for the tsar. In this way, with minimal effort and little upfront expense, the tsar made great strides toward stabilizing his frontier. This was not a unique solution for managing frontier security in an early-modern empire. It was an essential tool, in fact, and the Russian state exploited the co-option of local elites across the entire Russian frontier into the twentieth century.2 However, this “new” defensive force presented a series of problems for Moscow. The tsar’s former Muslim Tatar enemies, who shared neither a language nor a religion with the tsar or his military forces, were now the defenders of the frontier against new Muslim foes. By the 1570s, Ivan IV temporarily added to this suspect population a new, potentially even more dangerous element: a number of exiled Russian elites from the interior, expelled for “disloyalty.” Despite the questionable loyalty of both groups, the tsar still expected that they accept their role as the frontier’s new gentry, the leaders of his military, and the men now responsible for defeating local rebels and nomadic raiders. While less than ideal, this plan formed one of the foundational pillars of the tsar’s elusive empire. It accomplished the goal of providing an inexpensive corps of military forces to secure the region, some with very old roots in the region. Relying as it did on former and current enemies to protect that same frontier, it had the singular virtue of being the only possible way of stabilizing the territory. Ivan’s ongoing Livonian War with Lithuania prevented the Muscovite army from ever returning to its southeastern border to restore order in case of some catastrophe. Demonstrating one’s loyalty through military service was the most important way for the local gentry to reinforce their high social status into the seventeenth century. That this policy worked in the long run should not distract from the enormous risks Muscovy took in implementing it. Still, the policy had a certain rough elegance. Without a record of loyal service, frontier elites could have their land seized—if not by the tsar, then by rivals seeking to gain advantage from their own service. For example, Ivan Stepanov syn Vorontsov died performing his obligatory military service in Astrakhan in the late 1630s. As happened elsewhere in Muscovy, his two sons, physically capable of assuming his military duties in the tsar’s cavalry, expected to inherit their father’s land and his service obligations. Sometime in 1640, though, a local soldier near Vorontsov’s estate in Arzamas petitioned the tsar, requesting to inherit it. The sons responded with a petition of their own, 118 Loyal Enemies...