On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy

Introduction

Introduction And more erroneous still would be the view that in the epoch of asthenia for and lack of joy in foundational word one could ever eliminate this state of affairs overnight by publishing a "book." Mindfulness, 60 The essays collected in this volume enter into the II dialogue" that throughout Heidegger's long and productive preoccupation with hermeneutic phenomenology is shaped within the thinking of 1?eing by the onefold of "what shows itself in itself, the manifest" (Phiinomen /das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende, das Offenbare) and "interpretation " (EPIlTJVEUElV, Auslegung) (GA 2:38 and 50). We must enter into this II dialogue" if hermeneutic phenomenology is to remain the only guide for understanding and appropriating the being-historical thinking of Contributions to Philosophy. Since this understanding and appropriation are ventures, I characterize the essays in this volume as being underway to this second major work of Heidegger's. The II dialogue" within the thinking of being is shaped by the thrust of hermeneutic phenomenology, that is, by the self-transforming onefold of "what shows itself in itself, the manifest," and "interpretation ." Accordingly, one of the premises of these essays is that the transcendental-horizonal thinking of Being and Time as well as the being-historical thinking of Contributions to Philosophy, each in its own way, originates from within this self-transforming onefold. To let the being-historical thinking of Contributions to Philosophy speak for itself, these essays enter into the II dialogue" within the thinking of being, which is shaped by the onefold of "what shows itself in itself , the manifest" and "interpretation." With this "dialogue" in mind, I adopt a dialogical approach, as distinguished from a monological one. 3 Copyrighted Material 4 Introduction I Let us first briefly consider the place these essays occupy in the hermeneutic situation surrounding Heidegger's thought in the United States. With few exceptions, this situation is dominated by discussions which do not take their orientation from the "dialogue" within the thinking of being which is shaped by the onefold of "what shows itself in itself, the manifest," and "interpretation." Appearances notwithstanding , these discussions are monologues because the thinking of the participants does not return to "stillness" (Stille)-not to be mistaken with the absence of sound-which Heidegger sometimes calls being (Sein) and sometimes be-ing (Seyn). As a monologue it returns the participants to their starting point: the deconstructability of the thinking of being, its invented"genesis," and the applicability of this thinking to reality as a criterion for its comprehensibility or incomprehensibility .3 Thus what transpires in and as such a discussion implicates a returning that ipso facto is monological and reductive. In contrast to this monological reductive returning, the returning that takes its orientation from the "dialogue" within the thinking of being is a return to "stillness"- a return which according to Contributions to Philosophy , is a matter of returnership (Riickkehrerscha!t), not of hours, days, or years.4 At the risk of oversimplifying this returnership, I consider Heidegger research in its light and suggest that in almost all cases this research occurs outside returnership because it is indifferent to the "dialogue" within the thinking of being which is shaped by the onefold of "what shows itself in itself, the manifest" and "interpretation." This research does not take its orientation from the "beginning" inherent in that "dialogue " and consequently fails to do justice to the thinking of being. In almost all cases such research follows associative thinking, that is, it begins and ends with historical influence, with what is extraneous to the "beginning" inherent in that "dialogue." By and large Heidegger research today employs historical theorizing and imposes the notion of historical influence on the thinking of being. It makes little difference whether this theorizing draws on Aristotle, or on Dilthey or Husserl; or whether for good measure it adds reflections on Nietzsche, or Junger without ignoring Plato or forgetting Kant or Hegel, to mention only a few examples. What is important is that historical theorizing takes its orientation not from the aforementioned Copyrighted Material Introduction 5 "dialogue" within the thinking of being but from the notion of historical influence. To put the essays in this volume into proper perspective, we must critically address the issue of historical influence. While the monological reductive approach to Heidegger's thinking of being takes for granted and does not question the notion of historical influence, the dialogical approach carefully...