Business Confronts Terrorism: Risks and Responses

Conclusion

Conclusion Threats The frequency and lethality of conventional (e.g., bombings and kidnappings ) and unconventional (e.g., bioterrorism and chemical terrorism ) political violence is expected to continue worldwide for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, suicide bombings in crowded civilian areas, explosions across the gamut of ground transportation, hijacked aircraft crashing into office buildings, sabotage of critical infrastructure, and bioterror attacks are no longer viewed as something fictional—even among those who have predicted that “it could never happen here.” To our dismay, many threats still remain. It is conceivable, for instance , that terrorists may target some of the approximately 600,000 bridges and tunnels in the United States. In 2003, an al Qaeda operative based in the United States pled guilty to aiding the group to find future terror targets, such as U.S. bridges and tunnels. Other threats, such as attacks on industrial plants, are not beyond the pale. At least one million people would be at risk of exposure to deadly chemical vapor clouds were terrorists to target any one of major 125 U.S. industrial plants. Similarly, there are more than 700 other plants that could put at least 100,000 people at risk. Warnings about terror attacks against U.S. chemical and nuclear plants are well documented. Additionally troubling are potential attacks against private sector infrastructures , including: information and communications; banking and finance; water supply; aviation, highway, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; and electric power and oil and gas production and storage. 174 Terrorists’ attraction to attack ground and air transportation worldwide is another basis for worry. These sub-sectors have been hit unusually hard: from the use of the chemical agent sarin on Japanese subways; suicide bombings on Israeli buses; nearly simultaneous, remote-control bombings of Madrid commuter trains on March 11, 2004 (known as the 3/11 attacks), to the devastating results of the 9/11 hijackings. Such types of attacks are harbingers of future carnage against these modes of travel. Terror groups’ proclivity to attack soft targets—restaurants, theaters , and shopping malls—is an abhorrent trend. This development is unlikely to dissipate in the near future because of its perceived “effectiveness ” (in the eyes of the terrorist), the prevalence of soft targets, and limited resources—intelligence, finance, equipment, and manpower— that can be allocated to defend against such dangers. The rising trend of simultaneous terror incidents—multiple bombings against Shiite worshipers in Iraq (Baghdad and Karbalah) and Pakistan (Quetta) in March 2004—is further cause for concern. Multiple , closely coordinated attacks aggravate the damage that terror incidents inflict. The tactic of initiating new attacks once emergency personnel arrive at the initial terror location is another vile development in the terrorists’ modus operandi. The expansive use of suicide bombers and attackers without regard to their ultimate fate has caused damage across sectors (e.g., food, lodging , entertainment, and transportation) and globally: in Europe (e.g., Russia), Asia (e.g., India, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka), Africa (e.g., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), and the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey). These developments have invoked concern across society about terror’s “walking bombs” and ways to defend against them. Terrorist groups’ fascination to return to terror targets previously attacked (e.g., World Trade Center in New York) or failed missions (e.g., the Capitol and White House) should also be kept in mind. The internationalization of terror groups—worldwide movement of terrorists, arms, training, funding, and operations—further complicates efforts to reduce terrorism. The unending breadth of terror groups’ victimization of government , industry, and civilian targets makes the specter of future harm real and ominous. It is possible that a future catastrophic attack may include methodologies and targets that have not seriously been envisioned. Conclusion 175 s Recognition by government, businesses, employees, and consumers of such possibilities will hasten their efforts to lessen terrorist risk. Defensive and proactive measures against terrorism at the individual level must be complemented by regulatory, policy, intelligence, and financial contributions that, as a group, only government and industry interests can muster. Weakness and appeasement of terrorists will only invite more terror, not less. This mistake seems to have occurred with Spanish voters, who days after an al Qaeda-linked attack in Madrid on 3/11, voted out the Popular (conservative) Party that placed Spanish troops in Iraq (which al Qaeda opposed), and replaced it with the Socialist Party, which called for removal of Spanish troops. This faulty rationale blames the victim, while exculpating terrorists because...