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Introduction The phrase “Arrow in the Dark” is mentioned in the report Eliezer Kaplan presented to the Jewish Agency upon his return from Turkey. Kaplan, the agency’s bursar and senior executive member, was sent to Turkey at the end of February 1943, three or four months after the Yishuv (pre-State of Israel Palestine) published an official declaration regarding the systematic annihilation of the Jews of Europe. His mission was to examine various ways of helping the Jews trapped in Europe and perhaps even to save them. Kaplan’s general impression after meeting with activists, diplomats, and intelligence agents based in Turkey was that the big rescue plans were either too complex politically and strategically or too far-fetched. He was convinced that these plans had little chance of success and that their inner logic is their failure. Nevertheless, he decided that it was necessary for the Yishuv to adopt a policy of shooting in the dark; even if the chances were slim, the arrow might strike some target after all. This book reconstructs and analyzes the aid and rescue activities of the Jewish community in Palestine, operations in which the yishuv was involved , and the part played by David Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in these ventures. It also examines the role of these activities within the overall agenda of the Yishuv and its leadership during the latter half of the Second World War to determine whether, and to what extent, Kaplan’s phrase accurately reflects the actual policy of Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in the Yishuv leadership. THE BOOK’S STRUCTURE The book consists of three parts. Part 1 focuses on clarifying three main spheres of interest. First, it examines the gradual yet growing awareness of events in Europe and the way in which use was made of information reaching the Yishuv. This process began with a sense of doom when Hitler rose to power. It came to an end during the final months of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, which marked a turning point in the awareness of the Yishuv leaders, who decided to warn not only their own community but the free world and its leaders by officially announcing that the Jews of Europe were being systematically exterminated. This part also examines the preparations leading up to the expression of fury and protest against the events in Europe by the Yishuv. The question is raised as to whether these were merely political tactics, or a kind of substitute for action. The Rescue Committee and its responsibilities are examined in order to determine whether it was the main tool for organizing rescue operations, as was originally intended, or merely an outlet for the Jewish public in Palestine to vent its anger and frustration. Part 2 is devoted to reconstructing, describing , and analyzing the Yishuv’s own rescue operations as well as other rescue initiatives in which the Yishuv was involved. Consisting of nine chapters, it is the book’s densest part and is intended to give the reader a clear understanding of the complexity of the rescue programs. Among other topics, this part deals with the various plans for the rescue of children, including attempts at opening additional channels by dispatching Shalom Adler-Rudel to Sweden and Wilfrid Israel to Portugal. Mention is made of the strident polemical debate in the Yishuv surrounding the integration within the community of rescued children—the same polemic that reflected the optimistic expectations of the imminent rescue of large numbers of children. 3 Jewish Agency ransom plans devised during the final thirty months of the war—the Transnistria scheme, the Slovakia plan, and the Europa ransom plan—are closely examined, as is the dispatch of Joel Brand and the mysterious offshoots of this affair, the two proposals received by Menahem Bader, a key emissary in Istanbul, to conduct separate negotiations with the Nazis. Other rescue efforts and ransom plans are also examined, including feelers sent out at the end of 1944 and early 1945 through representatives in Geneva and Stockholm that culminated in a meeting with Himmler in the spring of 1945, just as the war was ending. Also discussed is the connection between these ransom proposals and the desire of various groups within the multifaceted Nazi elite to conduct separate negotiations with the West. This part also examines the secret cooperation that existed between the Yishuv’s intelligence services and British and American intelligence services involving aid and rescue operations—a key issue, since it...

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