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Six From Clandestinity to Civil War The victory of the Popular Front was at first not viewed as a total disaster by Falangists, for they could now argue that their tactics had been proven correct and the moderate electoral policy of the CEDA a failure. Some party militants were convinced that their hour was approaching. As the local chief of Seville later wrote: After the February elections I had absolute faith in the triumph of the Falange, because we could now consider the right, our most difficult enemy, defeated and eliminated. Their failure provided us with a great advantage, as well as the inheritance of the greater part of their best youth. Moreover, we were absolutely certain that the Popular Front would also fail, given its internal divisions and antinational position, openly opposed to the sentiments of a large number of Spaniards. Our task simply consisted in broadening our base among the workers.1 It is clear that Jose Antonio himself did not see the situation as one of final polarization leading to civil war. Like many others, he was still at least partially captive to the myth of Manuel Azaiia as the great statesman of the left who might provide creative leadership. His article "Here Is Azaiia," which appeared in Arriba on 23 February, was surprisingly positive , declaring that experience would enable Azaiia to do better than in his first government, and that if he established a broad national basenot just a sectarian leftist one-he would have a chance to enact important reforms. Jose Antonio recognized Azaiia's talents as "exceptional," as he had in the past, and declared that "in spite of all its great defects, universal suffrage this time has shown signs of good sense and justice," almost balancing the popular vote (if not the parliamentary representation ) between left and right, giving the middle-class left better representation than the revolutionaries, and repudiating the Radicals. This was another of the disastrously inaccurate political analyses to which Jose Antonio was so prone. Privately, Alejandro Salazar (Jefe Nacional of the 185 186 PART TWO. JOSE ANTONIO AND FALANGE ESPANOLA SEU) wrote in his diary, "he has expressed to us his blind faith in Azafia. He thinks he will manage to carry out a work of national revolution." 2 The other Falangist leaders were more skeptical, so that their first meeting after the elections was fairly gloomy, and in fact in less than two weeks Jose Antonio would radically change his evaluation. As it turned out, the only initial advantage for the Falange was that the amnesty for political prisoners declared by the new government resulted in cancellation of the charges pending'against Jose Antonio since July 1934 for illegal possession of firearms. The most immediate concerns for the Falangist leadership were, first, that the new leftist government might proceed to outlaw the fascist party, and, second, that the defeat of the right and the resultant rightist movement toward extremism might swamp the Falange with new rightist members . Jose Antonio told the editorialists of Arriba to concentrate their fire on the right and go easy on the leaders of the Popular Front. In a circular of 21 February to local leaders throughout Spain, he directed: The leaders will take care that no one adopt any attitude of hostility toward the new government, nor of solidarity with the defeated rightist forces.... Our militants will completely ignore any request to take part in conspiracies, projects of coup d'etat, alliances with forces "of order," or any similar things.3 All new members-and soon there would be many new members from the right-were to be required to pass through a probationary period of four months before enjoying any role of responsibility within the party. The attempt to nationalize the left remained a basic priority, and at some point after the elections Jose Antonio made contact with the moderate prietista sector of the Socialists through the physiology professor Juan Negrin. The aim was somehow to split the Socialist Party, uniting the Falange with true "national Socialists"-as Jose Antonio conceived the prietistas to be-even to the point, it was alleged, of offering Prieto the leadership of any such fusion. The moderate Socialists, however, refused to negotiate; "social fascism" was not an object of attraction.4 Jose Antonio was perfectly aware that the new government might adopt strong measures against the Falange, and hence his concern to avoid the slightest provocation, to the extent of warning against the wearing of external...

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