The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State

9. The Seventh Scourge: The Security Forces

9 The Seventh Scourge: The Security Forces The paradox offorce In 1977, following the invasion of Shaba by Katangans from Angola, President Mobutu declared that the Forces Armees Zairoises had suffered a "moral defeat" because of the discouragement of the soldiers, caused in turn by the "negligence ofcertain oftheir leaders, irresponsible and greedy, not always devoted to the national cause."l Even earlier Mobutu had expressed dismay over the persistent shortcomings ofthe army; in the 1974 enumeration of the "ten scourges" ravaging Zairian society, he identified the seventh as "a costly and unproductive army."2 Indeed, as House has observed, the problem went back to the coup which brought Mobutu to power: "Since the Annie Nationale Congolaise, or ANe [now FAZ] came to power in 1965, it has served paradoxically as the source ofsecurity for the Mobutu regime and as the principal creator ofhavoc in the country."3 In other words, neither constitutional legitimacy nor party support would suffice to maintain Mobutu's rule were it not underwritten with visible force. Yet the army's legendary indiscipline and repeated incapacity to defeat even small and poorly armed foes make it an object of scorn. It is, as Mobutu declared, relatively costly to maintain. In addition, the threat of renewed political intervention by the army is ever-present. The hegemony and power ofthe state rest upon the force it controls, but that force is unreliable in times ofcrisis, its depredations undermine the credibility ofthe state, and its capricious actions may threaten the state itself. To explore this paradox, we will first review the actual combat record ofthe armed forces during the Mobutu years, then search for explanations for the character of the FAZ. The mechanisms for maintenance of political control of the army merit consideration, as do the various efforts to improve its performance. While we focus primarily upon the army, by far the most important branch of the security forces, we also consider other components. 248 The Seventh Scourge 249 From the advent ofthe New Regime until 1980, the FAZ engaged in a half-dozen major military engagements: 1. The campaign to eliminate insurgent pockets subsisting from the 1964-65 rebellions 2. The Katanga gendarme mutiny in Kisangani in July 1966 3. The much more serious mutiny ofmercenary and Katanga gendarme units from July to November 1967 4. The invasion of Angola, in coordination with FLNA forces, from August to December 1975 5. The 80-day war against FLNC invaders from Shaba, March through June 1977 (Shaba I) 6. The briefwar against FLNC fighters who seized Kolwezi in June 1978 (Shaba II) Recapitulation ofthese episodes will set the stage for considering the performance issue. The combat record Vestiges ofthe rebellions In November 1965, although the main forces of the insurrection had fallen apart and most external assistance had ceased, there were still important areas in Haut-Zaire, Kivu, and northern Shaba where insurgent bands continued to operate. Despite the several hundred white mercenaries serving with the Zairian security forces, reimposition of central government authority proved slow and difficult. Eventually, factional strife among the exiled rebel leaders, and a final end to foreign supply, weakened the remaining insurgents. At the beginning of 1967, insurgents retained effective control only in two small regions of Kivu and in seven or more pockets in Haut-Zaire.4 Little by little, the army put down the remaining pockets of rebellion, except in the Fizi area of southeastern Kivu, where the insurgent forces put down deep roots. Survival of the rebel pocket in the Fizi area has been a result of two main factors: first, the opposition between rebels and government had been grafted onto factional conflict within the Bembe ethnic group; sec- 250 The Seventh Scour;ge ond, the rebels had established some sort ofmodus vivendi with the government forces. By 1973, the rebels had retreated from their earlier bases near Lake Tanganyika to new ones deep in the mountains; as they retreated , they were accompanied by one Bembe faction. A Bembe who had served as porter for the army during search-anddestroy missions in the hills above Fizi has confirmed the complicity between the FAZ and the rebels. He claimed that "all the military authorities are delighted to be named to the Fizi operational rone, because ... it is their chance to make a fortune." Numerous high-ranking officers were engaged in trade, some operating boats between Mboke and Baraka, Zaire, and Kigoma...