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7 In Pursuit ofLegitimacy: Party and Ideology In our opening chapter we suggested that the pursuit of legitimacy is a prime imperative conditioning the action of the state. A certain prescriptive legitimacy may reside in the simple prolonged exercise ofstate power by rulers whose authority appears beyond challenge. The elements oftacit legitimacy enjoyed by the Bula Matari state rested essentially upon the effective and sustained monopoly of coercion, given ideological articulation in the doctrines of trusteeship, the "civilizing mission," and parsimonious dispensation of welfare for its subjects. This basis for state legitimacy was largely dissipated in the pagaille years by the spectacular deflation ofstate authority. The New Regime, in pursuit of an elusive legitimacy for the state it sought to build, initially projected itself as a caretaker authority whose mission was the restoration ofa strong state. With civil society risking dissolution through the intensity of its unrestrained struggles, salvation, for most, seemed to reside in a program of state resurrection. A short-lived legitimacy was available for the Mobutu regime through this transitional mission. But the New Regime had more extended ambitions; it sought a formula for indefinite perpetuation ofits rule, and a fusion ofthe fortunes ofthe regime and the state. The institutional device for fulfilling the legitimation imperative, unveiled in 1967, was the MPR-"the nation politically organized." In the ideological realm, a legitimating myth was sought in the successive doctrines of "authentic Zairian nationalism," "authenticity ," and "Mobutism." In our efforts to identify the nature ofthe MPR and its ideology and to examine its effectiveness in legitimating the state, we shall begin by presenting the party as it presents itself, setting forth a chronology which can be linked to the periodization of regime development described in chapter 2. Then we shall examine the functioning of the party, both in terms of the functions assigned to it in official literature and those usually ascribed to parties in treatises on comparative politics. 185 186 In Pursuit ofLegitimacy Prelude to the MPR Initially, the orientation ofthe Mobutu regime was anti-political and very much anti-party. The Proclamation ofthe High Command ofthe Congolese National Army, by which the 1965 coup was announced, began by arguing that there was a contrast between the military situation, alleged to be "satisfactory," and the "complete failure" of the political leaders, who had "shut themselves up in a sterile struggle to gain power without any consideration for the well-being ofthe citizens ofthis country." I While the proclamation of the high command made no explicit mention ofthe political parties, there were signs ofdanger for the existing parties in the message President Mobutu sent to the joint session ofthe legislature on the afternoon after the coup. The message reiterated that the new government (whose ministers represented provinces, not parties) would serve for five years, and that a regime dJexception (analogous to a state of emergency) was to be imposed throughout the country.2 Political activities by parties were suspended. The parties themselves, however, were not at once dissolved, and in fact continued to function. Several issued communiques in support ofthe coup. One evident reason for taking no action against the political parties during the early weeks ofthe regime was that Mobutu needed the support ofat least some ofthe politicians and parties. In particular, Mobutu seemed to be seeking the backing ofthe FDC ofNendaka and Karnitatu, the principal organized force opposed to the CONACO ofTshombe. In fact, the Mulamba government relied to a considerable extent upon the old politicians of 1960-65, and especially upon those associated with the FDC. That reliance was nowhere acknowledged in the public pronouncements of Mobutu. To the contrary, his continuing verbal assaults on the "politicians " presaged both his attempts to reduce their participation in his government and to create a personal political instrument. Unlike sweeping measures of later years, instituted almost overnight on the basis of little apparent preparation, creation of the MPR was an incremental process, occurring over a period of about sixteen months. The first step was the creation ofthe Corps des Volontaires de la Republique (CVR).3 The Mobutu coup had taken place in the context ofintense activity on the part of political ''youth movements" in the capitol. Two days earlier, the Ligue des Jeunes Vigilants (League of Young Vigilantes) had organized a militant demon~tration of 200 people at the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa. According to its statutes, the purpose ofthe Ligue was "to fight [18.117.186.92] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 10:39 GMT) In Pursuit...

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