The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era

5. Conciliation and Conservation, 1900-1912

5 Conciliation and Conservation, 1900-19 12 he failure ofthe Joint High Commission temporarilyobscured the progress that the United States and Canada had made toward an equitable solution to the fur seal dilemma. So long as Canada held out for some important concession on another issue, there would be no progress; in fact, at times the crisis seemed to worsen. But the momentum for conservation was building on both sides of the border and in the Old World, and both governments felt pressure to save the species. Although the American offer changed only slightly over the next several years, Canada declared it acceptable in 1911, having finally reached the conclusion that further intransigence was detrimental to Dominion interests. Canada's-and Japan's-acquiescence and American patience demonstrated the power of preservationist sentiment and the equanimity of the proposal, both ofwhich were reinforced by scientific evidence. Years before the conclusion of the convention, government officials from all interested powers admitted that conservation ofthe species was a worthy goal in itself. No nation wished to carry the blame for driving the fur seal to extinction. But at the same time, none wished to be the only country making a sacrifice to save the seal. Thus the American proposal to share the proceeds to be gained by seal conservation was the logical, and perhaps only, foundation for an agreement that saved both the species and the sealing industry. All interested scientists agreed that seals were in decline, and the only reasonable explanation was the mass killing offemale seals by pelagic sealers. The seals and the pelagic sealers could coexist no longer, and the governments had to choose which to drive to extinction. For years the Canadian and Japanese governments believed they had to choose between citizens and seals, which was not hard to do. But eventually they recognized the real complexity of choosing between sealers who were 133 THE NORTH PACIFIC FUR SEAL CONVENTION destroying their own industry and powerful foreign governments that were offering financial and moral inducements to end pelagic sealing. Canada, in particular, faced pressure from Britain to save the seal and, consequently, the seal-fur industry in London. That choice was not so easy, but ultimately they agreed to yield to scientific evidence, moral outrage, and economic reality. That the United States was still interested after so many years was a testament to the power of the economic, scientific, and moral arguments for seal preservation. At times of exasperation the government flirted with the idea of destroying the species in order to be done with the disagreement, but that idea was economically shortsighted, scientifically indefensible, and morally abhorrent. When resolution of the crisis seemed near, Americans actually agreed to give away even more oftheir proceeds in order to salvage the species and the fur harvest. Thus a diplomatic resolution came at the darkest moment, when the herds were at their lowest, because the costs of failing to cooperate had become so high. Those costs had risen because ofthe work ofscientists and conservationists in promoting protection of the fur seal. Led by David Starr Jordan and his government scientists on one side and Henry Elliott and William Hornaday on the other, defenders ofthe seal had built a compelling case to outlaw pelagic sealing. Their ultimate success in banning pelagic sealing came despite a serious split in how they perceived the seals and nature in general. Jordan, the rational scientist, wanted to manage the seals to increase productivity , while Elliott, the impulsive raconteur, advocated leaving the seals to their own devices. When they combined behind their mutual antipathy toward pelagic sealing, they made a powerful force; when they divided over management plans, they revealed the weaknesses ofthe conservation movement . ELLIOTT'S DAY IN THE SUN The resolution of the Alaska boundary dispute in 1903 opened the way for more negotiations on the Bering Sea controversy. But lingering bitterness in Washington and Ottawa from the collapse ofthe Joint High Commission distracted diplomats from the cooperative solution that seemed possible in 1899. SecretaryofState John Hay and the British ambassadors agreed in 1903 and 1905 to restrict sealing, but Canada rejected both deals as contrary to its national interests. Out ofthe impasse came a proposal from Henry Elliott to 134 Conciliation and Conservation share the herd with Canada. In contrast to the diplomatic failures, this idea provided the basis for a settlement in the future. Like his predecessors, Hay viewed the...