Unending Crisis: National Security Policy After 9/11

Conclusion

197 Conclusion S o What should We maKe of all thIs? In JanuaRy 2001, the United States had been the indispensable world leader for nearly sixty years. After the end of the Cold War, it was left standing as the sole hyperpower, but even during World War II, it was the strongest state in the world and, over the forty-five years of the Cold War, was first among equals between the superpowers. America’s power rested on the enormous strength of its economy and the military-industrial complex that had been built on it. President Eisenhower rightly warned against allowing the military-industrial complex to threaten the country’s liberties and democratic system, but he also recognized that it was necessary for achieving victory in the long, gray struggle called the Cold War. And just as the United States prevailed in World War II, it also did so in the Cold War. Important to this latter success, in addition to economic and military strength, was the power of American ideals, to which virtually all the world’s peoples aspire to some degree. The administration of George H. W. Bush successfully ended the Cold War with very little loss of life, an historic achievement, and led the United States and the world into the post–Cold War era. In January 2001, at the end of the Clinton administration, the United States was in a very good place. It was at peace, a major terrorist plot against it had been thwarted, and the economy was strong, based on government surpluses as far into the future as anyone could see. But just eight years later, the United States’ international situation, as described in this book, had disas- 198 CoNCLUSIoN trously declined, and the country had suffered the most severe economic disruption since the Great Depression. In the years since 2008, efforts have been undertaken to restore America ’s place in the world. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) entered into force in 1994 and expired on December 5, 2009. President Obama and Russian president Medvedev signed a replacement treaty, referred to as New START, in the spring of 2010. However, when the treaty was brought to the floor of the Senate during the six-week-long lame duck session at the end of 2010, certain Republicans attempted to block a vote on ratification on the grounds that there was not enough time for debate, and anyway there was no hurry. But the United States had been without START verification measures applicable to Russia’s strategic forces for more than a year, and the success of the so-called resetting, that is, the improving , of U.S.-Russian relations was closely tied to the fate of New START. As New START is a limited agreement—looking ahead to further negotiations on deep reductions in nuclear weapons—it is difficult to ascertain a reason to oppose it other than politics. The treaty essentially commits the United States and Russia not to exceed their currently planned levels of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and restores the expired START verification system, two unobjectionable but desirable objectives. Some charged that New START undermined ballistic missile defense, but that was not the case at all, and the United States had long ago abandoned any plans for a missile shield against Russia. To say that such obstructionism was contrary to U.S. interests is an understatement; the future success of nuclear nonproliferation policy, including the Iran issue, for which Russian cooperation is essential, depended on a positive vote on the treaty. On December 22, 2010, with perseverance by the White House and thirteen Republican Senators who put aside politics, New START was approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of seventy-one to twenty-five, not the ringing endorsement some arms-control treaties had received but good enough. The treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. President Obama made a serious effort, implemented by Secretary of State Clinton and other senior officials, to restart the Arab-Israeli peace talks, but thus far, there has been only very limited success and little support from the Israeli government under Prime Minister Netanyahu. New Israeli settlements quickly derailed the peace process. The effect of the Arab Spring on this issue may be considerable. On the one hand, a democratic Egypt could be less friendly toward Israel, and changes in Jordan CoNCLUSIoN 199 might have a...