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South Korea, Taiwan, Arab States: Restrained Regional Missile Programs On September 26, 1978, at a South Korean military base, several antitank rockets, multiple-loaded rockets, and a new 180 km range ballistic missile zeroed in on their targets to the applause and cheers of a hundred viewers. Witnessing the missile display were President Park Chung Hee, his cabinet ministers , Korea's army chiefs, and General John Vessey, commander of U.S. forces in Korea. Seoul's ministry of defense proclaimed that South Korea had become "the seventh country in the world to produce the missile."I The Korea Herald boasted that Seoul's new missile was "powerful enough to overwhelm the North's Frog-7 [rocket]," adding that the missile's development "marks a gigantic leap forward in the national endeavor to establish a self-reliant defense posture" and that "the U.S. government decision last year to withdraw its forces from Korea has created the vital need for this country to accelerate the buildup ofour defense industry."2 Yet South Korea did not build much in the way oflonger range missiles for the next twenty years. Elsewhere in East Asia, another regional power's missile ambitions were also restrained. Lingering fears of a Chinese military invasion made deterrence a motive for Taiwan's repeated missile attempts. In 1974, an issue of Overseas Scholars published an advertisement from Taiwan's Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology seeking seventy-seven missile-related specialists. In subsequent years, Taiwanese students sought missile training at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This program was soon canceled by the State Department , and Taiwan's ballistic missile ambitions remained grounded for the next quarter century. In the Middle East, four national missile programs were similarly constrained. In an impressive display of rocketry, Nasser's military paraded three ballistic missiles at its July 25 Revolution Day celebrations in the 1960s. These missiles barely flew, and despite several further missile development attempts, Cairo could 90 SOUTH KOREA, T AIW AN, ARAB ST A TES not build a medium-range missile during the next forty years. In March 1980, deep in the Libyan desert, a new rocket took off but failed to reach orbit; over the next two decades, European customs prevented critical technology shipments from reaching Libya and thwarted Muammar Qadaffi's missile programs. In 199I, Palestinians cheered as Saddam Hussein's forces fired dozens ofmissiles at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; yet shortly thereafter, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) substantially dismantled Baghdad's missile arsenal. In 1998, during a regional crisis, Syria moved 36 Scuds to the AI-Samiyah base some 70 km from Turkey. These missiles had been bought from North Korea and were not built in Syria. That year, not counting missiles in Egypt or Iran, Israeli intelligence still assessed that between one to two thousand ballistic missiles could threaten their country by 20IO (380 to 950 in Iraq, 350 to 5IO in Libya, and 400 to 460 in Syria).3 These projections mayor may not materialize. By 2002, neither Iraq nor Libya had advanced their missile plans, though Iraq had the capability for a substantial missile breakout. South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Libya all embarked upon ambitious missile programs but were constrained from advancing these much beyond Scud-type missiles. U.S. leverage largely curbed the missile ambitions of technologically advanced South Korea; U.S. influence along with the MTCR'S barriers checked the missile ambitions of technologically advanced Taiwan and technologically weaker Egypt; Iraq's missile activities were curbed by the UNSCOM regime; and technology embargoes alone were sufficient to delay Syria's and thwart Libya's missile programs. SOUTH KOREA South Korea built 180 km range NHK-I and NHK-2 ballistic missiles from the mid-I 97os, but was not permitted longer range missiles or a space launcher until it entered the MTCR in 200I, when it was allowed 300 km range missiles. Security threats from North Korea and domestic political pressures sustained Seoul's missile quest, but a U.S. security guarantee and U.S. political leverage moderated the scope of Seoul's missile activity. The Historical Origins ofa Missile Capability South Korea began early missile development through a 1972 agreement with the United States to service American Hawk and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles in Korea.4 A U.S.-supervised maintenance facility was set up in Korea under a local firm, Gold Star Precision Industries Ltd. In 1975, South Korean personnel received training from the U...

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