Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control

1. Introduction

Introduction In a February 2001 report to Congress, the Bush administration called attention to a looming missile threat. It noted that "in a world where more than a dozen nations possess ballistic missile technology, and a number of nations are racing to acquire weapons ofmass destruction, America's most pressing national security challenge is to reduce our current vulnerability ... against missile attack."I The previous year, President Clinton had also stated that a missile threat to America was "real and growing."2 Fears about the spread of ballistic missiles had greatly increased since August 1998, when North Korea stunned the world by launching a three-stage rocket over Japan and into the Pacific. Many Japanese were shocked to the point of terror; headlines in Europe ominously declared, "Europe Comes into Range";3 and the U.S. media warned of a "serious" future missile threat from North Korea and Iran.4 Ballistic missiles enable states to rapidly deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons over vast distances. Missile proliferation is therefore among the foremost international security concerns. When faced with mutual challenges and concerns, states often coordinate their national policy responses through multilateral regimes. In 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was initiated to contain the missile threat. During the MTCR'S first decade, several regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were thwarted from advancing their missile ambitions . In light of these positive developments, MTCR members expressed satisfaction with the regime at its tenth anniversary. Yet in subsequent years, other states such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Israel tested medium-range missiles, and several additional states retained missile arsenals and missile ambitions . These developments demonstrated the MTCR'S weaknesses and raised critical questions about its ability to halt further proliferation. What accounts for the MTCR'S successes and limitations? How well can it 3 4 INTRODUCTION continue to curb missile proliferation? What measures may enhance its effectiveness ? More fundamentally, how well can multilateral regimes manage security affairs? Can regimes such as MTCR contain deadly technological advances that undermine international security? Are technology control regimes only useful for ten years and not much longer? These questions are examined in this book, which explains the operation and effectiveness of the MTCR through the framework of international regimes. THE ARGUMENT The MTCR is a multilateral agreement of over thirty states to restrict their transfer of missiles and related technologies. The MTCR'S basic premise is that denying foreign technology and expertise to regional powers can curb their missile programs. A typical missile program requires expertise in chemicals (for rocket propellants), metals and materials (for airframes and re-entry vehicle heat shields), and electronics (for guidance systems), and an engineering capability to design and integrate various missile components. The first chapters of this book examine how well and why major suppliers such as Western countries, Russia, and China complied with the MTCR'S policies against missile exports. The Western states, which were not selling complete missiles but were important technology suppliers, largely curbed their technology transfers. Russia and China halted sales of complete missiles and adopted stronger export controls but their firms still transferred some technology to regional powers. The political dynamics ofthe MTCR are also worth noting. While cooperation is essential for building regimes, conflicting interests, power politics, and the use of sanctions and incentives are behind the bargaining processes that lead to cooperation. These factors influenced the primary suppliers to rein in their missile technology transfers. This book then examines the MTCR'S impact on target missile programs. Nine regional powers-Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Libya-restrained their missile efforts in the 1990s. They either ceased missile activity or limited their missile projects to cruise missiles, artillery rockets, and 100-300 km range ballistic missiles. Yet five other statesIran , Pakistan, North Korea, India, and Israel-built and tested 1,000-2,000 km range ballistic missiles. Moreover, and somewhat paradoxically, although the technologically stronger target states would be more likely to overcome the MTCR'S embargo and advance their missile activity, this outcome has not materialized. Instead, many technologically strong states (for example, Argentina, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea) curbed their missile programs, while some technologically weaker states (Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea) advanced their missile activity. This suggests INTRODUCTION 5 that technology embargoes alone do not explain missile outcomes. Technological...