Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control

8. Toward a Treaty Regime

Toward a Treaty Regime: Five Institutional Options to Tackle Missile Proliferation In November 2002 at The Hague, ninety-three countries adopted and signed an International Code of Conduct for missiles. The Code had gained precedence over another missile nonproliferation initiative, a global control system (GCs) for missiles that was discussed during 2000-2001 at meetings in Moscow. The GCS and Code of Conduct contained important confidence-building measures (CBMS). They called upon states to increase the transparency of their missile programs and provide notification of rocket launches. In a third missile initiative, a UN experts group examined ways to curb missile proliferation. And in a further initiative, the United States and Russia signed agreements for ajoint data exchange center (JDEC). When established, the JDEC would provide information on U.S. and Russian rocket launches and preclude a false missile attack warning. Can theMTcR's technology barriers, along with confidence-building measures ofthe Code ofConduct and JDEC, restrain missile proliferation? Would an NPT type treaty be necessary if the MTCR and missile confidence-building measures are not sufficient to contain missile proliferation? These questions are explored in this chapter. The first section of this chapter assesses how well the MTCR has tackled the two issues that fall within its scope: restricting missile technology transfers and thwarting missile development in target states. The second section analyzes whether the MTCR'S supply embargo can be retained in the long term; it examines national perspectives on the MTCR, and the regime's consolidation and future prospects. The third section explores the need for a broader missile nonproliferation regime because of increasing trends in missile proliferation, the possible revival of missile sales, and the limitations of ad hoc missile elimination measures. The fourth section examines five policy initiatives and institutional options to strengthen the missile nonproliferation regime: regional missile free 152 TOWARD A TREATY REGIME 153 zones, global intennediate-range missile bans, flight-test bans, verification mechanisms , and space service initiatives. ASSESSING THE MTCR, 1987-2002 Missile Exports and Technology Transfers In its first fifteen years, the MTCR substantially halted missile sales and technology transfers. On the issue of missile sales, two major missile exporters, Russia and China, are not known to have exported ballistic missiles since the early 1990s. The third major exporter, North Korea, reduced the quantity but perhaps not the quality of its missile sales in the middle and late 1990s. The missile regime also moderately controlled technology transfers. Major suppliers such as West European states, Russia, and China adopted and implemented strengthened export controls, although Russian and Chinese finns nevertheless supplied some dualuse industrial technology to regional powers. Moreover, the MTCR raised international awareness ofmissile proliferation, and it provided states with a structure and technological guidelines to deal with missile proliferation. The MTCR'S technical parameters also expanded to prohibit the transfer of a wider category of missiles and related technologies. In 1987, the MTCR covered only nuclear capable missiles, which were defined as missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a 300 km range. By 1993 the regime covered any missile system intended for WMD delivery regardless of its payload weight. Further, in the mid-1990s, the MTCR tightened its supply embargo by covering the transshipment of missile technology. U.S. attempts to interdict North Korean vessels carrying Scud missiles to Iran and Syria were successful in 1991, but failed in 1992. In January 1993, German authorities halted a ship carrying machine parts to Syria. In late 1996 at Zurich airport, Swiss officials intercepted missile parts en route from North Korea and China to Egypt. I The 1996 MTCR plenary examined controls by states that might unknowingly contribute to proliferation through transshipment facilities such as ports. Transshipment and export control seminars were also added to the MTCR'S outreach activities. These included a 1997 Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo, subsequent Export Control Seminars in 1998 in Berlin and Neuchatel (Switzerland), and transshipment workshops in Washington, London, and Switzerland, attended by Cyprus, Hong Kong, Jordan, Malta, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates, in 1996-97. In addition to expansions in the regime's scope, the MTCR'S domain greatly increased. By 2002, the regime had thirty-three members plus additional adher- 154 TOWARD A TREA TY REGIME ents, reflecting wider international acceptance ofthe regime's prohibitions against missile technology transfers. Target Missile Programs and MTCR Effects As a result of its tight technology embargo...