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6 Stopping Nuclear Explosions: The Test Ban F r o m t h e e a r l i e s t o f t i m e s , a f t e r t h e completion of the negotiation of the npt in 1968, the npt nonnuclear weapon states emphasized that the number one quid for their quo of renouncing nuclear weapons was an end to nuclear weapon tests—that is, a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This has been reiterated at every npt review conference since, and was an express condition of the indefinite extension of the npt in 1995. At the npt Review and Extension Conference in 1995, the United States and the other four npt nuclear weapon parties agreed that they would complete negotiation of the ctbt by 1996. This was probably the single most important promise made to gain wide support from nonnuclear weapon states for making the npt permanent. It was for many nations a test of the sincerity of the United States and the other npt nuclear weapon states with respect to their npt obligations. Many nonnuclear weapon par7 4 ties have long relied upon the ctbt to reduce what they perceive as npt-authorized discrimination against them. This commitment was met, and the Comprehensive NuclearTest -Ban Treaty was signed in 1996. It established a complete and worldwide ban on all nuclear test explosions and provided for a vast international monitoring system composed of hundreds of seismic stations and other technical stations spread all over the world. President Bill Clinton was the first official to sign the treaty, at the ceremony at the United Nations; 171 other countries have since signed. One hundred and fourteen countries have ratified the treaty, including Britain, France, Russia, and Japan. However, it has not yet come into force. The treaty provides that all countries with nuclear facilities on their territories must ratify it for it to come into effect, and only thirty-one of the required forty-four have done so. The U.S. Senate rejected the ctbt in 1999, and there are no plans to call for its reconsideration by the Senate in the foreseeable future. The ctbt is overwhelmingly in the security interests of the United States. It would be verifiable, and would in no way diminish the reliability and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The United States currently has a significant advantage over Russia and China—and indeed the rest of the world—in terms of the sophistication of its nuclear arsenal and the depth of knowledge possessed by its nuclear scientists. This advantage was developed by conducting well over 1,000 nuclear explosive tests (greater than the combined total of nuclear tests conducted by the rest of the world) and translates into a U.S. nuclear force of unmatched effectiveness. The Soviet Union and Russia conducted 715 tests; France, 210; and China, 45. Britain, which has had access to U.S. test data, has also conducted 45 tests. A nuclear explosive testing program involving full-scale tests is necessary to provide confidence in the reliability of newly s t o p p i n g n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s / 7 5 designed nuclear weapons, which are extremely complex. No responsible political leadership, no competent modern military authority, and no nation depending on nuclear weapons for its security could be expected to deploy a modern nuclear weapon without a full-scale test program. For its part, the United States has used on average six explosive tests before certifying its new weapon designs; France reportedly has used as many as twentytwo . Since under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty no nation could conduct tests, it would not be possible for a state to develop a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Thus, the ctbt would keep new designs for advanced weapons out of the stockpiles of Russia, China, and, of course, the United States, as well as other states with nuclear weapons. Under the ctbt, the U.S. arsenal would continue to consist of the world’s most advanced weapons. No nation is better prepared to maintain the reliability of nuclear weapons, in a non-testing environment, than the United States. The information gathered by U.S. scientists through the nation’s extensive nuclear testing program contributes to the effectiveness of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program which, if properly funded, will ensure that the safety...

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