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5 The Political Value of Nuclear Weapons I n t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h e c o l d w a r , n a t o was composed of countries seriously weakened—in some cases, virtually destroyed—as a result of World War II, who were confronted across the inner German divide (the line between nato-governed West Germany and Soviet-controlled East Germany ) by massively superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. It was feared that these forces could overrun Western Europe in a matter of days, and nato governments did not have the financial strength to put sizable forces in the field. U.S. forces were present in Europe in significant numbers throughout the Cold War, but even with the U.S. forces, nato forces were significantly inferior to the Warsaw Pact forces arrayed on the other side; the disparity in battle tanks, for example , was three to one. To redress this imbalance, the United States and nato adopted a policy of holding open the possibility of employing tactical nuclear weapons to halt a massive Warsaw Pact assault. The United 6 3 States deployed up to 7,000 tactical or short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, which undoubtedly helped to keep the peace and alleviate Soviet pressure on Western Europe. While nato likely would only have resorted to nuclear weapons in extremis, the Soviets could never be sure. Because of the threat of escalation to strategic nuclear war and of putting itself at risk, it was uncertain whether the United States would ever actually use these weapons. The question was often raised, “Would the United States risk New York to save Paris?” President Charles de Gaulle didn’t think so. He withdrew France from the nato Nuclear Planning Group and initiated the French nuclear weapon program. Thus, during the Cold War, the massive conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe was offset in part by U.S. and nato nuclear weapons. However, in the post–Cold War world, it is nato that now has the conventional force preponderance in Europe— by a two-to-one margin over the East. Due to the ongoing confrontation during the Cold War, there were limits to what could be accomplished to redeem the npt arms control commitment of the nuclear weapon states. The political value of nuclear weapons was very high. To be considered a great power in the post–World War II world, a state needed to possess nuclear weapons; to be considered a superpower (as were the United States and the Soviet Union) required the possession of thousands of nuclear weapons. Now, years after the end of the Cold War, the value of nuclear weapons remains very high. Although it is an historical accident, the five npt nuclear weapon states are the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. Often referred to as the p-5, these states— the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China—are considered in many respects to be the world’s most influential states. This preeminence in influence seems to some degree keyed to the possession of nuclear weapons authorized by the npt. A former Indian foreign minister has referred to this situation as 6 4 / p o l i t i c a l v a l u e o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s “nuclear apartheid.” The purpose of npt Article 6 and the 1995 Statement of Principles and Objectives was to redress this perceived discrimination within the npt regime. If the nonproliferation objectives thus set forth are to succeed, there must be a reduction in the political value of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, these weapons will, over the long run, be too attractive (and the fifty-year-old technology involved too simple) to control, and the npt will ultimately fail. The salt negotiations during the 1970s between the United States and the Soviet Union put the first limitations on the nuclear arms race, in effect placing an upper limit on strategic nuclear missiles and bombers (the delivery vehicles of strategic nuclear warheads ) and agreeing on the first reductions. The start negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s between the United States and Russia produced the start i and start ii Treaties, which established significant reductions in nuclear missiles and bombers. The start i Treaty, which was signed in 1991 and entered...

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