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6 OCEANOGRAPHY, EAST AND WEST One cannot stress enough that the history of international cooperation in oceanography has been conditioned by geopolitical considerations. It was largely the U.S. Navy that provided the means of ascent for American oceanographers, and it had clear strategic reasons for doing it. Easing tensions was the rhetorical backdrop of the igy, and economic development became that of subsequent years. Previous chapters have shown how important competition was to the Americans, at home and in international forums.ButtherewasmoretotheAmerican-Sovietconfrontationthancompetition for leadership. The Soviets were unlike other scientific partners, and theyneverfullybelongedtotheinternationalcommunityof oceanographers, despite having contributed a huge amount of resources and time to oceanic surveys and international meetings. They were outsiders, and for a couple of reasons. One is that many Western countries simply did not trust them, which this chapter should make clear. But the other reason, and perhaps a more important one, was that Soviet science did not seem to be on the cutting edge of research. Soviet oceanographers used old techniques, and they preferred to promote surveys for data collection rather than investigations of scientific problems. Why this should be so was a matter of speculation, and many scientists attributed it to flaws in the Soviet system: it was too bureaucratic, too top-down, too controlled by the Communist Party. The fact that the Soviet proposals for international expeditions always were huge in scope but limited in their specific scientific goals only reinforced beliefs that Soviet oceanography was being manipulated by the Soviet government for propaganda purposes and that scientific innovation was stifled; bigger was always better, form took precedence over substance. At the same time, the intergovernmental and increasingly bureaucratic character of the ioc alienated many scientists, who felt that their own autonomy in conceptualizing research was being threatened. Some scientists blamed the Soviets for this. In addition, Soviet motivations were consistently opened to question by scientists and government o‹cials in the West. Worse, conceptual diªerences among leading physical oceanographers and especially among geophysicists led to stark contrasts in the research agendas of East and West, making cooperation appear less and less useful. This went beyonddiªerencesininstrumentation,andbythelate1960sSovietandWestern scientists were developing strikingly diªerent theories about the oceans. Combined with embarrassing political and social interactions in international forums, this did little to bring the communities together. The Soviets would remain outsiders, despite their domineering—though not dominant—presence in the ioc. the intergovernmental stigma The ioc Secretariat identified three areas in which international cooperation would be crucial. Data exchange was the first. It reasoned that such exchange, if done promptly and completely, would lead to more e‹cient eªort, prevent duplication, and facilitate planning for future work. All of these were aims routinely enumerated by those who favored international research. The second aim of cooperation was to establish common standards , units, and methods in order to make data exchange worthwhile. The third and most complicated area of importance was in cooperative expeditions themselves, which had gained tremendously in importance during the previous decade. Such projects permitted scientists to cover a large area in a short amount of time, thus moving closer to the ideal “synoptic” study, the same rationale that had motivated Roger Revelle to advocate including Japan (as well as Canada) in the norpac expedition in 1955. Still, the amount of coordination diªered greatly between projects. Large-scale ones such as those of the igy and the iioe were built primarily from national programs and the amount of coordination could be quite loose, with little connection between the scientific programs of individual ships, and instead depending upon data exchange as the only specifically cooperative act. Smaller programs between fewer countries, such as the norpac expedition, the Naga expedition, and even the icita program, allowed close integration of scienti fic programs, coordinated planning of ship tracks, and often the results themselves were published jointly.1 Such categories, however, were far from fixed. The idea that the icita and small expeditions might be closely coordinated , even directed, by agreement in the ioc struck many scientists as an infringement upon their intellectual freedom. 178 Oceanography, East and West Oceanography, East and West 179 The rising tide of national and intergovernmental oceanographic programs , while providing new opportunities and increased financial support, appeared rather bureaucratic, and even as a constraint on scientists’ freedom of inquiry. Woods Hole oceanographer William von Arx noted that “national programs” had certainly come into vogue to gain financial...

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