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c>HAPTER TWELVE NPT AFTERMATH *ND THE END OF ACDA After the successful conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, I thought that a possible subject that I might work on was the development and extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is one of the commitments in the Statement of Principles and Objectives document , and I had written a memorandum to John Holum before the end of the conference emphasizing its importance. In one of the many letters I received after the conference, Fiji's ambassador to the United Nations reminded me of our commitment to the South Pacific Forum and that he hoped "your government will be able to adhere as a protocol party to the Raratonga Treaty soon." At the conference, I had been impressed by private statements of several prominent NAM ambassadors who said that they were content with a permanent NPT, but in agreeing to an NPT of indefinite duration , they were not agreeing to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapon privileges by five states. Either substantial progress toward fulfilling the commitments of the Statement of Principles and Objectives , most importantly significant reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, needed to be made or at some point they would consider reviewing their commitment to the NPT. Ifnuclear weapons were going to remain a criterion of distinction between states that have special influence and those that do not, then they did not intend to remain second-class citizens forever. Thus, nuclear weapons must become less important politically for nuclear non-proliferation to succeed for the long-term. There was an effort to conclude a conference final document based on the work of Committee I of the conference. That committee, chaired by Ambassador Ayewah of Nigeria, as I said, had been run like a court trying nuclear weapon states for the crime of the possession of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, the committee made little progress, whereas the other two committees on peaceful uses and safeguards were close to agreement on language. In the last two days of the conference, the proceedings to conclude a final document had been taken over by the conference president, Ambassador Dhanapala. Nigeria and Egypt were very difficult in these meetings, and Britain and France drew a line in the sand against strong language about the importance of nuclear disarmament and of achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons. Ralph Earle and I went to see Dhanapala around mid-day on the last day of the conference. He was very upset. He said that if Britain and France were going to continue this kind of behavior for the next five years (which they most definitely did not; they were the nuclear weapon states who had delivered on the Statement of Principles and Objectives by the year 2000), this could lead to a movement of states to withdraw from the NPT. Dhanapala is a great man to whom the world community owes much. He is devoted to the NPT regime, but he very much shares the NAM view of the political significance of nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear disarmament. I reported the situation not long after to a full meeting of the Western Group, referring to nuclear weapon states rather than to Britain and France. I described the president as being very upset with the final document proceedings to the forty or so ambassadors and their aides. It was decided to send our capable group chairman, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom, to go and talk with Dhanapala. The Western Group meeting then concluded and I called a quick huddle of the United States delegation . I emphasized that Dhanapala was not talking about the United States. (Christine visited me for the last days of the conference and she was present at that meeting. Undoubtedly, she thought it was all a bit crazy-and it was.) Shortly after, Michael Weston walked by on his way to see Dhanapala. I was standing next to French Ambassador Errera, who expressed misgivings as to whether this would work out well. Errera was always a keen observer of representatives of other states. He once said that we must not suggest something to the Russian delegates, as this would only strengthen for the particular issue the "nihilist" tendency that all Russians share. The conference ended that night with no final document. But Michael Weston, an outstanding ambassador who had most effectively led the Western Group throughout the extension process, in my impression, did in fact make...

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