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CHAPTER NINE SURVIVAL OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY InI992, Secretary of StateJames Baker commissioned a panel to study the merits of integrating ACDA into the Department of State. The chairman of the panel was Ambassador Jim Goodby, an outstanding retired career officer with a distinguished background in arms control and my former colleague on the Rowny "hit list." Contemporaneous with this there was a brief Carnegie Endowment study, "Organizing Foreign Pol- - icy for the Twenty-First Century," chaired by Richard Holbrooke, later the architect of NATO enlargement as ambassador to Germany, assistant secretary of state for EUR in the first Clinton administration, author of the Dayton Accords, and later u.S. ambassador to the UN. The Carnegie study cursorily concluded that with the end of the Cold War there was no longer any justification for the independent existence of ACDA, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the United States Information Agency (USIA) and that these agencies should be folded into the State Department. It was sort of a manifesto of State Department bureaucratic irredentism. The Goodby panel was far different. It did a thorough examination =------ of the consolidation issue with respect to ACDA only. The panel interviewed former negotiators such as Max Kampelman, and nongovernmental organization leaders such as Michael Krepon, the president of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Max was in favor of consolidation, and Michael urged that ACDA either be revitalized or consolidated. Ron Lehman, a fierce supporter of ACDA independence, was quite worried about the panel and urged me to cooperate with it as fully as I possibly could. The inspector general ofState (and ACDA after I988), Sherman Funk, contributed an important part ofthe final report. He strongly supported independence, and used the Pakistan case mentioned earlier as a justification. In brief, the Pressler Amendment (a substitute for more stringent legislation introduced by Senator Alan Cranston) provided for a complete cutoff of U.S. aid, both military and non-military, to Pakistan, unless the president each year certified to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device, and that the provision of continued aid would inake it less likely that Pakistan would acquire such a device. Each year after I984 DOD, State, and ACDA submitted their views for the consideration of the president as to whether he could make such a certification. Beginning in I986, when it became clear that Pakistan did in fact possess a de facto nuclear device, and there was no way to argue that continued aid would make it less likely that Pakistan would acquire a nuclear device, ACDA began to recommend against certification. State and DOD continued to recommend in favor of aid to Pakistan, with the Afghan War still going on, but both sides of the issue were in front of the president solely because of an independent ACDA. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Bush and subsequently President Clinton declined to certify. As a result, U.S. aid to Pakistan was terminated and the transfer of a large number of F-I6s, for which Pakistan had already paid, was blocked. Sherman Funk correctly made much of this example and later testified before the Congress to this effect. The final report of the Goodby panel endorsed the Krepon concept of revitalizing ACDA, but if that could not be accomplished then ACDA should be consolidated with the State Department. It contained a list and description of revitalization suggestions such as housing all negotiations within ACDA and giving ACDA more authority with respect to the control of sensitive exports. The report contained a paragraph on the unique value of the office of general counsel and stated that the office was a special repository of the skill and knowledge needed to draft, negotiate, and implement arms control agreements. The report added that this was the case to an important degree because of the capabilities of the general counsel himself. This comment of course gratified me but it hurt Mary Lib and perhaps others. The authors, I am sure, were just being kind to me partly because of my long tenure and had no intention of slighting the contributions of anyone else. There were many outstanding individuals in the ACDA General Counsel's Office at that time, and Mary Lib was at the top of the list. Bill Clinton won the election in I992 and the State/ACDA transition team arrived a week or two later. Brian Atwood headed the State transition team. He had been Doug Bennett's...

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