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GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANCE of what has been achieved in technical monitoring capabilities over the past sixty years, as described in this book, it should be clear that the need to protect both the development and operation of space-based and other reconnaissance capabilities is critical to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century. National monitoring capabilities, especially reconnaissance satellites, are increasingly threatened by the possibility of an arms race in space, Postscript 123 by which oªensive ASAT capabilities could expand. It is of the greatest importance that this not happen and that space remain a sanctuary for these important national monitoring capabilities. December 1, 2004, marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, which preserved the continent as a nonmilitarized, nuclear-weapon-free area—the first arms control agreement of the modern era. The debate that preceded the negotiation of that treaty is remarkably similar to contemporary discussions on the future of outer space. In the first half of 1950s, there were about a dozen countries vying for scientific, economic, and military interests in Antarctica, an uninhabited, borderless, and lawless land. In time, and after much debate, those twelve states—with others joining afterward—decided that the greater interests of all of the aªected parties would be served best if the continent could be preserved for peaceful uses and that those interests could best be protected through a legal arrangement rather than the use or deployment of military forces. Today, the international community is faced with similar questions about how to protect the assets associated with the use of outer space. Here again, we have a borderless realm rich in commercial, scientific, and military potential and questions about how best to preserve these assets. Will military deployments and the weaponization of space be required to defend critical space technology? Indeed, is—as some have suggested—the weaponization of space an inevitable evolution of current and historic realities? A great deal rides on the answer to these questions. Scientifically, the stakes are quite high, with everything from the International Space Station to the Hubble telescope and the exploration of Mars potentially aªected by instability and unpredictability in outer space. The commercial implications are even greater. But perhaps most important of all are the reconnaissance satellites that are the subject of this book, as well as those satellites designed to give early warning of missile attacks. Similarly, it is also evident that outer space is becoming a more 124 POSTSCRIPT dangerous place. Several countries, including Russia and China along with the United States, have developed sophisticated ASAT weapons, and several others are thought to be seeking such weapon systems. If they continue to proliferate, ASAT weapons have the potential to dramatically undermine fundamental U.S. interests as well as world security. The realization of the increasing vulnerability of the United States to attacks against space assets has caused some to encourage Washington to begin to deploy defensive weapon systems to protect those assets from new weapons. While this could appear to make sense on a basic level, a thoughtful analysis of the history of military development reveals flaws in this notion. Most important, modern history categorically demonstrates that eªective defensive weapons systems will inevitably be countered by eªective oªensive systems, sparking an ever-spiraling arms race that ultimately leaves all sides less secure. The Outer Space Treaty joined the Antarctic Treaty in a unique class of arms control agreements sometimes referred as nonarmament treaties. These agreements were intended to—and they have been successful—prevent the deployment of weapons in areas where they have not previously been present. Today, after more than three decades, space remains free of WMD. It has been suggested that a legal regime to prevent the weaponization of space could be crafted simply by building upon the Outer Space Treaty. There may be some merit to this idea, especially considering the fact that the treaty has more than ninety states parties. However, the subject is complicated and there are many important interests to protect— telecommunications, navigation, and weather systems— but of the highest importance are those space assets used to verify treaty compliance and for intelligence. Ensuring noninterference with these assets is crucial to ensuring peace and security in the twenty- first century because of the central role they play in preserving con- fidence in the nonproliferation regime and in international security arrangements generally. President Reagan’s devotion to the Russian adage of...

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