Notes
205 NOTES Introduction 1. These interventions occurred in 1960, 1971, 1980, and, arguably, in 1997, when pressure from the military forced the coalition government headed by Necmettin Erbakan (of the now-outlawed Islamist Welfare Party) to step down. 2. Here I follow Schmitter and Karl who, in an influential essay, explicitly refined conventional comparative politics definitions of “democracy” to specify that “popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding . . . opposition from unelected officials” (1991, 81). 3. Political liberalization refers to actions such as the enlargement of individuals ’ and groups’ freedoms of speech and movement and freedom from arbitrary state actions. Following Ibrahim (1995, 43–52), liberalizing and democratizing progress was made during the Third Wave and beyond in Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—although, in many cases, retreats and reversals subsequently transpired. 4. These include democratic elections in the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, the holding of municipal-level elections in Saudi Arabia, and the announcement by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that more than one candidate will be able to contest future presidential elections there. 5. See the analyses contained in Posusney and Angrist 2005. 6. See Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1995, 6–10) for a concise but comprehensive overview of this literature—and its critics. 7. A strong and un-nuanced statement of this point of view appears in Kedourie 1992. Huntington offers a relatively more balanced assessment (1991, 307). 8. Here Inkeles and Smith (1974) exemplify the paradigm, arguing based on survey data that subjects across the globe were undergoing personal psychosocial transformations—from “traditional” to “modern” men—as they partook of the expanding educational systems, mass media circuits, and factory-based labor markets that emerged in industrializing societies. 9. See Diamond 1992 for a survey of these works. 10. A second prominent argument holds that, in the face of Soviet demands for political and territorial concessions, the Republican People’s Party acceded to political pluralization out of a belief that doing so would help Turkey acquire the economic and military support of the emerging Western Cold War alliance (see Yılmaz 1996). Chapter 6 will show that this is only a partial explanation of Turkey’s competitive regime outcome, one that leaves important elements unaccounted for. 11. Clearly, such an approach can be employed only in places and times in which parties exist. 12. He himself states that mass material interests are the motor force of his argument (1991, 6). 13. The set of cases treated in this book therefore excludes Libya, North Yemen, and the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates ,andOman)becausepoliticalpartieseitherdidnotexistatallorplayedextremely marginal roles in regime-formation processes after independence. Though Lebanon ’s postindependence political stage technically did include political parties, it is excluded because, due to electoral law design, political parties were not the primary actors in the parliamentary system that was established there at independence in 1943. From that time until the start of civil war in 1975, the maximum share of parliamentary seats won by parties was only one-third; the vast majority of members of parliament were independents (Harik 1975; Baaklini, Denoeux, Springborg 1999). 14. Analytically, the tenth case (Morocco) falls somewhere in between the first and second categories and will be treated in chapters 1 and 4. 15. For the eight countries that had been controlled by Britain or France, transitional periods began at independence. Turkey’s transitional period began in 1923. The Ottoman Empire experienced its terminal collapse in that year when rival Turkish political-military leaders defeated the armies that had invaded following WWI, declared Turkey a republic, and began fighting over the republic’s future political structure. For Iran, 1941 began an analytically equivalent transitional period. In that year a new, weak king assumed the throne, inaugurating an era lasting more than a decade during which political parties struggled with one another and with the shah to shape Iran’s post–WWII regime. 16. The logic here is consonant with and informed by Dahl’s (1971) classic formulation that polyarchy is difficult to establish when governments would endure 206 notes to introduction 6] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 09:14 GMT) high costs if they tolerated their oppositions, as well as by Alexander’s (2002) more recent claim that democracies become consolidated when the right believes that the left is fundamentally and predictably a moderate political force. 17. Ertman (1998) makes similar observations...
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