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CONCLUSION TheArgumentsinMiddleEast andComparativePerspective 188 Thisstudyhassoughttoimproveourunderstandingofthereasonswhymostcontemporary Middle East states evolved authoritarian regimes in the postimperial period and why Turkey is a notable exception to this rule. It has emphasized the pivotal role played by party actors in the regime-formation processes that unfolded in ten countries in the region as political elites navigated critical historical junctures when old rules had crumbled and new rules were open to be shaped. The analysis combines attention to party system characteristics with an understanding of democratic regimes as political -institutional bargains that are viable only if no relevant actor wishes to defect. The book asserts that regime outcomes in the region can be understood most systematically not as the ineluctable result of cultural attributes , levels of modernization, or class configurations, but instead as the relatively more contingent product of the features of indigenous party system characteristics at a specific point in time. In Tunisia, South Yemen, and Algeria, because single preponderant parties dominated postindependence politics, there was no bargaining over the rules of the game. No other actors possessed sufficient stature to force nationalist parties to the bargaining table. The latter simply did as they pleased, and the result was immediate authoritarian rule. In Iran, Iraq, Jordan , Syria, and Egypt, authoritarian regimes also took root, but only after interim transitional periods had unfolded. While all five countries had an opportunity to build upon fledgling competitive institutions, polarization and mobilizational asymmetry in their party systems drove parties to defect from democratic arrangements, clearing the way for the establishment of dictatorship. During Turkey’s interim transitional period, the party system became decreasingly polarized and increasingly mobilizationally symmetrical over time. The ruling rpp defected from pluralizing experiments in 1924 and 1930 because its opponents’ platforms and/or support base threatened its ability to maintain its elite status. By the late 1940s, however, the opposition had moderated its platform and the ruling rpp had much improved its grassroots organizational presence. These developments in large part facilitated the inauguration of competitive politics in Turkey beginning in 1950. Ultimately, the claims advanced here are probabilistic rather than deterministic . The study argues on empirical and theoretical grounds that party system polarization and mobilizational asymmetry each will independently lower the probability that a given nascent democratic bargain will survive, because these dynamics will shape the calculations of those actors whose acquiescence is crucial if democracy is to be viable. As these are not the only variables that bear on possibilities for democracy, not all countries with fledgling competitive institutions and troubled party systems will fail to settle on competitive politics. At the same time, polarization and mobilizational asymmetry are central variables that, holding constant all other pertinent factors (such as the external environment, wealth levels in society , and political culture), should render the survival of nascent democratic bargains problematic. In addition to demonstrating the relevance of party system characteristics for founding regime outcomes in the Middle East, the book also explored the determinants of several key party system characteristics themselves . This analysis produced evidence for the causal relevance of explanatory factors that are quite familiar to comparativists who ponder party number questions. That is, electoral rules and the extent and type of societal cleavages formed part of the explanation for the shape of party systems in the six multiparty cases considered here (Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey). However, the study also brought to light the crucial role that outside actors played in structuring regional party systems. The impact of imperial powers’ policies on the sociopolitical standing of traditional elites, and imperialists’ responses to traditional elites’ demands for independence, had much to do with the number of parties that occupied national political stages at independence. Finally, the book highlighted the importance of preexisting social capital for party-building enterprises. This dynamic appeared most prominently in the Turkish case, which evolved a conclusion 189 6] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 01:05 GMT) two-party system not only due to majoritarianism and center-periphery conflict, but also due to crucial elite networks that allowed the periphery to develop a unified rather than a fragmented response to the overbearing center. TurkishExceptionalismRevisited Turkey is exceptional in the Middle East because it was the only state in the region to emerge in the postimperial era having developed competitive political institutions—institutions that have survived to the present day. This is the observation that drives the premise of this study. The Introduction acknowledged, however, that the extent of Turkish exceptionalism was not...

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