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5 ReligiousRituals,Society, andPoliticsduringthePahlaviPeriod While the state tried with futility to control Moharram rituals, these same rituals continued to evolve independently of the state’s direct control. During the Qajar era, Moharram rituals (such as the taªziyeh, the rowzeh khani, and the Moharram procession) were among the most important means of promoting religious and political legitimacy . These rituals were also important in strengthening patron-client relationships and a variety of social identities, including ethnicity, profession , regional affiliation, and quarter/neighborhood alliances. Compared to the Qajars, the Pahlavis were aggressive about supplanting these identities with a “national” identity that would supersede this multiplicity of identities. Moharram rituals had previously served as a means of mediation between the state and society, thus allowing for a plurality of identities . Reza Shah viewed Moharram rituals as a threat to this program and therefore set out to eliminate them. Mohammad Reza Shah followed a similar yet less consistent path. The fundamental similarity in their policies was the trend toward using a model of national identity , which either was overtly hostile toward Moharram rituals or, at the very least, would allow only a subordinate and more limited sphere of influence for such rituals. It is interesting that the government of the Islamic Republic, which came into power in 1979, has followed yet another path, involving the transformation of these rituals into a vehicle for a single identity accompanied by a “revolutionary” movement led by the state. While the overall patterns of patronage and organization of ritual performances were influenced and informed by the actions and policies of the state, they also evolved independently of the Pahlavi agenda. During the Qajar period, merchants, ulama, ministers, government officials, military officers, landowners, and heads of guilds were patrons of Moharram rituals.1 This pattern was interrupted begin67 ning with the early reign of Reza Shah. At this time, ritual ceremonies sponsored by ministers and wealthy elites associated with the state became noticeably less prevalent. Elites no longer considered ritual patronage to be a desirable means of promoting social status. In addition , there was a complete break in such elite patronage when Reza Shah outlawed many of these activities in the 1930s. Things changed with Reza Shah’s abdication, which was followed by a period of liberal national government led primarily by secularists surrounding Mosaddeq. During these years of decentralization of government authority, and relative tolerance of political diversity, there was a shift on the part of the state toward a tolerance of Moharram rituals . For example, some members of the legislature, notably Ayatollah Kashani, publicized their participation in such rituals.2 While such trends do not indicate a complete turnaround on the part of Iranian elites associated with the government, they are symbolic of a relative shift toward participation in these rituals. The modernizing nationalists did not adopt such rituals en masse, but, rather, segments of society , which had enthusiastically supported such rituals previously, now did so in the open. Old organizations such as guilds and ethnic associations reemerged in the public sphere as sponsors of Moharram rituals . It is also at this time that there was a flourishing of new hey’ats, some associated with the state and some developing independently.3 Some majales sponsored by elites praised the shah and his program. Some of these patrons praised the shah in the traditional way by praying for him, while others praised him in their public pronouncements. For example, below an advertisement for a majles in 1956, the organizer Abbas Namavar said: “Especially because of the attention paid by the agents of his Majesty the Shah, new buildings and decorations have been built in this holy shrine which are worthy of being seen and which warrant saying prayers to his Majesty the ‘promoter of religion .’”4 Another example of sponsors supporting the shah is a majles in the bazaar (Takyeh-e Dabbaghkhaneh) that was attended by government ministers, members of the national legislature, various bureaucrats , diplomats from Islamic countries, and military officers and that ended with prayers for the shah.5 One of the most striking trends during this period was the persistence of various preexisting identities in ritual performances and patronage. Ethnic groups, regional alliances, guilds, and neighborhoods all began publicly advertising such ritual events as they had done before the ban.6 These identities certainly still 68 ReligiousRituals,Society,andPoliticsduringthePahlaviPeriod existed, and they were quick to take advantage of the change in government policy to begin publicly promoting themselves through...

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