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Chapter 7: In Conclusion, Three Liberal Projects Reassessed
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7 IN CONCLUSION, THREE LIBERAL PROJECTS REASSESSED I ARRIVED ON THE ZIMBABWE·MOZAMBIQUE BORDER AT A TIME OF HIGH hopes. A century after the Moodie treks, postemancipation, postcolonial states-bolstered by liberal-minded donors and NGos-controlled both banksofthe Rusitu. Surely,thesewell-meaningpeopleandinstitutionswould prevent a second colonization of Chief Ngorima's territory. Just as surely, they would bar settlers from Chief Gogoi's domain. Agencies were striving to improve the political and economic standing of rural Africans. I joined their efforts. Earlier chapters narrated these and related endeavors. None ofthemachievedan unequivocalsuccess. Implementerstendedtobrushaside such failures and their own complicitywith land-grabbing. Episodic breakdowns in the field did not undermine the soundness ofliberal plans. At this point, however, those plans and agendas deserve reappraisal. Southern African liberal projects arose as colonial planners confronted "the native problem." The problem, or, more neutrally, the "question," has grown to encompass three issues: (1) how to emancipate rural Africans as individuals; (2) how to enfranchise or empower them in political systems; and (3) how to advance them economically. These desires led to three liberalprojects , all rooted in eighteenth-centuryEuro-American ideals offreedom , meritocracy, equality, and democracy. To emancipate Africans, missionaries and British native commissioners eradicated bride-service and the system ofwealth in people. Since independence, NGOS and state agencies in both countries have helped "empower" smallholders through various local committeesandcouncils. Peasantselectedademocraticleadershipthatbegan 186 IN CONCLUSION, THREE LIBERAL PROJECTS REASSESSED to displace hereditary monarchs (chiefs and headmen). Finally, in the quest to advance smallholders economically, development programs are recruiting investment for the black lowlands. If successful in Zimbabwe, they will overthrowthesegregationist, Rhodesianorderofrace andspace. InMozambique , theywillpreventsuch anorderfrom evercoalescing. Willsmallholders be better offas a result? These liberal projects have undermined structures that provided security-clientship, lineage-based leadership, and native reserves-in favor ofstructuresthatgivegreaterscope for ambition. Business firms certainly benefit from this expansion of opportunity. As in the past, somesmallholderswillbeableactentrepreneurially,maximizingtheirwealth and power. Optimists andneoliberalsare bettingthateveryonewillbenefitabest -case scenario. Theymisjudgethe dangers. In fact, something closer to the worst case is now imaginable: in the "investment zones" of Southern Africa, the weakest, poorest rural people are in danger oflosing their claim on charity, their political voice, and their agricultural base. Whatalternativeexists? Posingthis questionraises uncomfortableissues for students ofSouthern Africa. There, liberal projects represent the hardwon principle ofequaltreatment for whites andblacks, for haves and havenots (Ferguson 1999:33). Especially in the face of President Mugabe's currentantiwhite rhetoric and actions, intellectuals, development practitioners, and conservationistsyearn for amultiracial, unitarysociety. How does one question this liberal ideal? I do so by arguing that, for people at the intersection of underprivilege in race and class-black smallholders-equal treatmentandequalprotectionare notgood enough. Theyfall farshort, and a status of equality may undermine minimal, colonial-era guarantees. Below, I argue for a series of entitlements that would recognize smallholders ' special needs regardingland. Provisionally, Iadvocate reviving the earlier notion of separate territorial arrangements whereby smallholders enjoyexclusiveaccess to the blacklowlands-without, however, beinglimitedto thelowlands. Attheveryleast, Isuggest thatcross-classand!orcrossracial partnerships createwidescopefor exploitation. Unity, in otherwords, also deserves a reappraisal along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. But is the time right for such acriticism in Zimbabwe? Since 2000, President Mugabe's government has arguably killed liberalism in Zimbabwe. The paramilitary occupations of 2000 and onward l;1ave abrogated rights ofprivate property. In their place, the ruling partyhas articulated anotion of race- and nationality-based claims to land on the highveld. Variegated groups ofpeasants, urban elites, and well-placed politicians have replaced 187 [35.172.194.25] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 11:52 GMT) PART 3. NATIVE QUESTIONS white landowners and their workforces. Meanwhile, draconian legislation has restricted nonstate media virtually out of existence. In Chimanimani, security forces run the district and carry out a campaign of persecution againstthe district'swhiteMemberofParliament, elected in 2000, and those around him. The elected institutions and committees ofthe 1990S have littie power, and their members have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of the state. After my last visit, in late 2002, police beat one of my hosts. They accused (but did not charge) him with associating with a suspicious white American. In sum, the state has fostered a climate of fear, intimidation, racism, repression, and theft. Yet, in so doing, the state has also stimulated, amongitsnumberless critics, arenewed faith inliberal institutions and values. Opponents ofthe regime demand arestoration of"law and order" and see salvation in a post-Mugabe torrent of foreign investmentand aid. Manyromanticizethe1990S, overlookingthefrustration with liberalism, investment, and aid that led some Vhimba residents to invade private land. Liberalism did not provide the people...