Montaigne after Theory, Theory after Montaigne

12. For a Theory of Forms in Montaigne

For a Theory of Forms in Montaigne Philippe Desan Theorizing montaigne before Descartes and the birth of modern philosophy is a serious challenge. Indeed, how does one systematize the thought of an author who didn’t claim to write anything other than Essais —literally, “attempts,” are bound never to quite succeed? From a philosophical perspective, the very form of the essay presupposes its inevitable failure, for otherwise it would no longer be an essai. Philosophers create systems, not essays. Yet Montaigne did elaborate a philosophy without precepts , mottos, or systems. His thought claims to be amorphous, or better, multifaceted (which hardly means powerless). Where Descartes and his followers sought to develop philosophies of content, Montaigne, on the contrary , was at pains to think of the form itself, or rather, many different forms. Form can only be conceived in relation to thought and the outer world; in this sense, Montaigne is really no different from both ancient and modern philosophers. However, Montaigne’s true originality is his fleeting attempt to think form as an organizing model of all knowledge. In his “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” Montaigne quotes a poem by 242 12 for a theory of forms in montaigne / 243 Ronsard where the mind is defined as “the world’s soul” (II, 12, 381).1 Without such a mind, claims the author of the Essais, there simply would be no world. In commenting on the poet’s verses, Montaigne evokes pagan deities—actually all forms of religion—that admire and venerate the world: “inasmuch as besides this, its grandeur and beauty, it is the part of this machine that we find farthest from us, and therefore so little known that they were to be pardoned for regarding it with wonder and reverence” (II, 12, 381).2 Our author is clearly less interested in the ecstasy and veneration than in the temporal, concrete and, as we might say, existential dimensions of the world and the mind. Even the most cursory of readings of the Essais leads to the following postulate: Montaigne does not believe in essence! All is form—or rather, forms, since diversity is inherent to the human condition. Variety is the very motor of humanity and its history: from the Ancients’ writings to cannibals in the New World, all are as many witnesses of the multiplicity of human thought and practices. Yet should we contemplate alterity and difference simply in order to let them mystify us? Isn’t it possible to sketch an inventory of humans and of the world, and draw from these some fundamental rules? These questions linger throughout the Essais. From an epistemological point of view, and so up to today, mere resemblance had sufficed to provide the illusion of a logic, of a hidden order encompassing what initially appears as contradictory. Everyone has in mind Montaigne’s famous formula, according to which “each man bears the entire form of man’s estate” (III, 2, 611).3 God would have thus provided all men with this visible essence at all times and places. Yet such an essentialist vision of man is frequently contradicted by Montaigne himself. Far from a logic of resemblance, Montaigne strives to identify difference and prefers to conceive of the human condition in terms of its diversity and the principle of distingo. This human condition is moreover only perceptible in particular situations, and it is therefore man in his individuality and materiality that Montaigne places at the heart of his inquiry. Is God then the source of the world and of the mind? According to Montaigne , the answer to this question lies once again in the observation of man as an individual and distinct being. Besides the “ornaments and ceremonious movements in our churches” (II, 12, 381),4 let us never forget that all boils down to man, for ultimately “it is man that believes and prays” (381).5 This first questioning on the origin of man’s mind is also a philosophical question, insofar as it implies interpretation and analysis. But once again, opinions differ and who is one to believe? Montaigne is weary of all knowledge founded on philosophical or theological authority. The world cannot be taught; it must be practiced. Even Aristotle, the greatest of philosophers, hesitated in explaining what governs all things: “Aristotle says now that it is the mind, now the world; now he gives this world another master, and now makes God the heat...