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9 / The Confrontation Cina's probing of u.s. intentions during Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye's visit in November 1995 and the increasingly apparent link between PLA pressure and Taiwan's electoral process led to a rethinking in some quarters of Washington. On 12 December, shortly after his return to the United States, Nye addressed the Asia Society in Seattle. He stressed the u.s. interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, sayingthat this had been one oftwo main areas ofdisagreement during his recent discussions with Chinese leaders. Pressed during the question-and-answersession about the u.s. response to Chinese probing on the issue of possible use of force against Taiwan, Nye stressed the imponderable nature and dangers of escalation inherent in such a situation . "Nobody knows" how the United States would respond to cross-, Strait conflict, Nye said. "Therefore actions which escalate risks in the Taiwan Strait, are actions which pose an enormous risk of some larger thing, ofwhich we don't know the answer." The dangers ofescalation on such an issue "which is taken very seriously by both sides, could be catastrophic."1 As ambiguous as his words were, they constituted the first high-level and public warning to Beijing during the mounting crisis that the u.s. might intervene in a cross-Strait war. Nye's words were underlined on 19 December when the nuclearpowered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz transited the Taiwan Strait on its way from Japan to the Persian Gulf area. This was the first time in seventeen years that a u.s. carrier had passed through the Strait. The circumstances of the Nimitz's passage left open to question, however, whether the highest level of u.s. leadership had endorsed, or indeed even knew about, the Nimitz's passage. When the transit was announced six weeks later, it was reported to have been authorized by CINCPAC headquarters in Honolulu.2 If the u.s. president didn't authorize the Nimitz's passage, if those in charge at CINCPAC or the Pentagon didn't want to let him know what they were doing-and certainly CINCPAC and the Pentagon understood the significance of such an action-would that president be likely to approve similar deployments in more risky situations? And if the 96 The Confrontation 97 president knew about the NimitzJs planned route but didn't want to publicly associate himself with it, would he be bold enough to order far more risky action in the near future? If an action such as the Nimitz's passage had taken place in late August, shortly after the conclusion of the PLA'S second round of exerdses, and been accompanied by demonstrations of presidential support and authoritative statements reiterating the interest of the United States in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves, the United States would have sent a much clearer signal to Beijing. The confrontation of 1996 might have been avoided. On the other hand, it might still have occurred but escalated to an even higher level of confrontation. The Nimitz's passage through the Strait was almost certainly observed by PLA intelligence, and the CMC understood the threat impliCit in this movement. Rather than back down before u.s. threats, China upped the ante. Former assistant secretary of defense Chas W. Freeman, in China for talks with senlor Chinese offidals at the end of 1995, was told that China was planning a missile attack against Taiwan during the week following the presidential election there. One missile per day would be launched for thirty days. Chinese officials also subtly raised the question of possible Chinese use of nuclear weapons against the United States in a war over Taiwan. Freeman returned to the United States and reported to Clinton's National Security Advisor Anthony Lake on 4January.3 A meeting of China specialists from inside and outside the government was convened under Lake's auspices In mid-January. The meeting focused on Beijing's increasingly belligerent rhetoric and the multiple reports of planned military action against Taiwan appearing in the Hong Kong and foreign press. The mid-january meeting substantially increased government awareness of and concern over the pOSSibility of Chinese military action against Taiwan. At the end ofJanuary the White House announced the Nimitz's passage six weeks earlier. Mounting congressional pressure began pushing administration pol. icy in the direction of greater firmness. The PtA exercises during the last quarter of 1995 prompted requests that the president...

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