We cannot verify your location
Browse Book and Journal Content on Project MUSE

Face Off

China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization

by John W. Garver

Publication Year: 1997

Published by: University of Washington Press


pdf iconDownload PDF (47.2 KB)
pp. vii-viii

read more


pdf iconDownload PDF (82.4 KB)
pp. ix

A great many people in the People's Republic of China, in the United States, and in Taiwan have helped this book's development by sharing with me their views about various matters. During a five month stay in Beijing during the first half of 1995 I discussed relevant issues with many people, Chinese and American. In March 1996 I traveled to Taiwan for two weeks with the support of Georgia ...


pdf iconDownload PDF (98.7 KB)
pp. xi-xii

read more

1. The Significance of the 1996 Crisis

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.4 MB)
pp. 3-12

In March 1996 the United States deployed two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan. This deployment, the largest concentration of naval power assembled by the United States in East Asia since the end of the Vietnam War, came against the background of unprecedentedly large and extensive military exercises by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Taiwan Strait designed to intimidate ...

read more

2. Taiwan's "Drifting Away"

pdf iconDownload PDF (2.0 MB)
pp. 13-26

Two major sets of grievances underlay Beijing's decision to launch large-scale military exercises to intimidate Taiwan. One concerned U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and the other a perceived movement of Taiwan away from unification with the PRC and toward independence. Those grievances were concisely laid out in a statement by a councilor at the PRC embassy in Washington, D.C., in a special issue of ...

read more

3. Taiwan's "Pragmatic Diplomacy"

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.0 MB)
pp. 27-34

In one sense, Beijing's military intimidation of 1996 was directed at the intellectual and political trends described in the last chapter. Those trends had given rise, however, to particular diplomatic activities on the part of Taiwan-aimed at securing for Taiwan protection of the legal norms of the international community-that provided the ...

read more

4. Beijing's Objections to U.S. Policy

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.6 MB)
pp. 35-46

Beijing believed that the true danger of Lee Teng-hui's nefarious scheme of "disguised independence" came from the United States. Without u.s. encouragement and support, Lee's "splittist" conspiracies would come to naught. With it, they would be very dangerous. Hegemonists in Washington, D.C., were supporting Lee's "splittism" as part of their strategy of weakening and containing China, many influential ...

read more

5. The Taiwan Issue in Chinese Domestic Politics

pdf iconDownload PDF (2.7 MB)
pp. 47-66

In the PRC, as in the United States and in Taiwan, there were strong links between the Taiwan issue and domestic politics. In China the Taiwan issue was linked to deep divisions within the CCP over the course of China's post-1978 reforms; to declining belief in Marxism-Leninism- Mao Zedong Thought and emergence of nationalism as a new source of state legitimacy; to the transition of political power from the ...

read more

6. The U.S. Visa Decision and Beijing's Reaction

pdf iconDownload PDF (988.9 KB)
pp. 67-73

On 22 May 1995 a White House spokesman announced that President Lee Teng-hui would be given a visa to visit the United States as a private individual. Lee was permitted to enter the country to deliver an address at the spring commencement ceremony of Cornell University, where he had received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics in 1968. Lee's visit would be the first by a Taiwan president since ...

read more

7. Beijing's Probing of U.S. Intentions

pdf iconDownload PDF (2.1 MB)
pp. 74-88

Between 21 and 28 July 1995 the PLA conducted missile and live-fire tests in a circular area of ten nautical miles radius eighty miles northeast of Taiwan, conspicuously near the air and sea lines of communication between Taiwan and Japan. When announcing the "tests," Beijing warned foreign vessels and aircraft to avoid the area. Foreigners complied. Over a period of a week ...

read more

8. The December Legislative Yuan Elections

pdf iconDownload PDF (966.4 KB)
pp. 89-95

A major object of Beijing's coercive policies was Taiwan's political process, key to which were the elections to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan scheduled for December 1995. These were only the second fully direct, popular election for the Legislative Yuan, the first having been in 1992. They were Widely seen in Taiwan as a prelude to Taiwan's ...

read more

9. The Confrontation

pdf iconDownload PDF (2.1 MB)
pp. 96-110

China's probing of u.s. intentions during Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye's visit in November 1995 and the increasingly apparent link between PLA pressure and Taiwan's electoral process led to a rethinking in some quarters of Washington. On 12 December, shortly after his return to the United States, Nye addressed the Asia ...

read more

10. Were China's Leaders Surprised by U.S. Intervention?

pdf iconDownload PDF (891.8 KB)
pp. 111-117

The question of whether China's leaders were surprised by the u.s. decision to deploy two battle groups off Taiwan is important, as it touches directly on the question of whether China miscalculated. That in tum tells us about the nature of Chinese elite perceptions of the world and about China's decision-making processes. Most important of ...

read more

11. PRC Strategy

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.2 MB)
pp. 118-126

If we assume. that in the Taiwan Strait crisis military instruments were used to achieve political objectives, we must ask what objectives Beijing sought through its campaign of military coercion against Taiwan. Very probably that campaign had minimal and maximal objectives toward both Taiwan and the United States. Those can be outlined ...

read more

12. Nuclear Coercion with Chinese Characteristics

pdf iconDownload PDF (925.6 KB)
pp. 127-133

One of the most important yet murkiest aspects of the Taiwan Strait crisis is China's possible use of nuclear coercion. Did China employ its nuclear arsenal during the crisis to deter u.s, intervention on behalf of Taiwan? Our conclusions here must be tentative, for the evidence is ambiguous and circumstantial. Yet I believe we ...

read more

13. The International Effect of the Crisis

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.9 MB)
pp. 134-147

Beijing's attempt to coerce Taiwan had an impact across Asia and even in Europe. When the smoke cleared, the crisis had Increased both apprehension regarding China's willingness to use military force and concern about the steady growth of Chinese military power, and had weakened the belief that China's growing economic interdependence would make ...

read more

14. Appraising the Gains and Costs of Beijing's Coercive Exercises

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.3 MB)
pp. 148-156

Was Beijing's exercise of coercion successful? Did it achieve its objectives? If so, did the costs of those achievements justify the gains? In answering those questions we must be acutely aware of preestablished beliefs and values. Both the conclusions of China's leaders and their advisors and of American analysts are likely to ...

15. Conclusions

pdf iconDownload PDF (1.4 MB)
pp. 157-166


pdf iconDownload PDF (1.6 MB)
pp. 167-180


pdf iconDownload PDF (878.8 KB)
pp. 181-187


pdf iconDownload PDF (624.6 KB)
pp. 188-193

E-ISBN-13: 9780295800356
E-ISBN-10: 0295800356
Print-ISBN-13: 9780295976174
Print-ISBN-10: 0295976179

Publication Year: 1997

Research Areas


UPCC logo

Subject Headings

  • China -- Foreign relations -- United States.
  • United States -- Foreign relations -- China.
  • Taiwan -- Politics and government -- 1988-2000.
  • China -- Foreign relations -- 1976-
  • Democratization -- Taiwan.
  • You have access to this content
  • Free sample
  • Open Access
  • Restricted Access