Face Off

Contents

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pp. vii-viii

Acknowledgments

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pp. ix-

A great many people in the People's Republic of China, in the United States, and in Taiwan have helped this book's development by sharing with me their views about various matters. During a five month stay in Beijing during the first half of 1995 I discussed relevant issues with many people, Chinese and American. In March 1996 I traveled to Taiwan for two weeks with the support of Georgia ...

Abbreviations

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pp. xi-xii

1. The Significance of the 1996 Crisis

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pp. 3-12

In March 1996 the United States deployed two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan. This deployment, the largest concentration of naval power assembled by the United States in East Asia since the end of the Vietnam War, came against the background of unprecedentedly large and extensive military exercises by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Taiwan Strait designed to intimidate ...

2. Taiwan's "Drifting Away"

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pp. 13-26

Two major sets of grievances underlay Beijing's decision to launch large-scale military exercises to intimidate Taiwan. One concerned U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and the other a perceived movement of Taiwan away from unification with the PRC and toward independence. Those grievances were concisely laid out in a statement by a councilor at the PRC embassy in Washington, D.C., in a special issue of ...

3. Taiwan's "Pragmatic Diplomacy"

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pp. 27-34

In one sense, Beijing's military intimidation of 1996 was directed at the intellectual and political trends described in the last chapter. Those trends had given rise, however, to particular diplomatic activities on the part of Taiwan-aimed at securing for Taiwan protection of the legal norms of the international community-that provided the ...

4. Beijing's Objections to U.S. Policy

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pp. 35-46

Beijing believed that the true danger of Lee Teng-hui's nefarious scheme of "disguised independence" came from the United States. Without u.s. encouragement and support, Lee's "splittist" conspiracies would come to naught. With it, they would be very dangerous. Hegemonists in Washington, D.C., were supporting Lee's "splittism" as part of their strategy of weakening and containing China, many influential ...

5. The Taiwan Issue in Chinese Domestic Politics

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pp. 47-66

In the PRC, as in the United States and in Taiwan, there were strong links between the Taiwan issue and domestic politics. In China the Taiwan issue was linked to deep divisions within the CCP over the course of China's post-1978 reforms; to declining belief in Marxism-Leninism- Mao Zedong Thought and emergence of nationalism as a new source of state legitimacy; to the transition of political power from the ...

6. The U.S. Visa Decision and Beijing's Reaction

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pp. 67-73

On 22 May 1995 a White House spokesman announced that President Lee Teng-hui would be given a visa to visit the United States as a private individual. Lee was permitted to enter the country to deliver an address at the spring commencement ceremony of Cornell University, where he had received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics in 1968. Lee's visit would be the first by a Taiwan president since ...

7. Beijing's Probing of U.S. Intentions

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pp. 74-88

Between 21 and 28 July 1995 the PLA conducted missile and live-fire tests in a circular area of ten nautical miles radius eighty miles northeast of Taiwan, conspicuously near the air and sea lines of communication between Taiwan and Japan. When announcing the "tests," Beijing warned foreign vessels and aircraft to avoid the area. Foreigners complied. Over a period of a week ...

8. The December Legislative Yuan Elections

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pp. 89-95

A major object of Beijing's coercive policies was Taiwan's political process, key to which were the elections to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan scheduled for December 1995. These were only the second fully direct, popular election for the Legislative Yuan, the first having been in 1992. They were Widely seen in Taiwan as a prelude to Taiwan's ...

9. The Confrontation

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pp. 96-110

China's probing of u.s. intentions during Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye's visit in November 1995 and the increasingly apparent link between PLA pressure and Taiwan's electoral process led to a rethinking in some quarters of Washington. On 12 December, shortly after his return to the United States, Nye addressed the Asia ...

10. Were China's Leaders Surprised by U.S. Intervention?

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pp. 111-117

The question of whether China's leaders were surprised by the u.s. decision to deploy two battle groups off Taiwan is important, as it touches directly on the question of whether China miscalculated. That in tum tells us about the nature of Chinese elite perceptions of the world and about China's decision-making processes. Most important of ...

11. PRC Strategy

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pp. 118-126

If we assume. that in the Taiwan Strait crisis military instruments were used to achieve political objectives, we must ask what objectives Beijing sought through its campaign of military coercion against Taiwan. Very probably that campaign had minimal and maximal objectives toward both Taiwan and the United States. Those can be outlined ...

12. Nuclear Coercion with Chinese Characteristics

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pp. 127-133

One of the most important yet murkiest aspects of the Taiwan Strait crisis is China's possible use of nuclear coercion. Did China employ its nuclear arsenal during the crisis to deter u.s, intervention on behalf of Taiwan? Our conclusions here must be tentative, for the evidence is ambiguous and circumstantial. Yet I believe we ...

13. The International Effect of the Crisis

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pp. 134-147

Beijing's attempt to coerce Taiwan had an impact across Asia and even in Europe. When the smoke cleared, the crisis had Increased both apprehension regarding China's willingness to use military force and concern about the steady growth of Chinese military power, and had weakened the belief that China's growing economic interdependence would make ...

14. Appraising the Gains and Costs of Beijing's Coercive Exercises

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pp. 148-156

Was Beijing's exercise of coercion successful? Did it achieve its objectives? If so, did the costs of those achievements justify the gains? In answering those questions we must be acutely aware of preestablished beliefs and values. Both the conclusions of China's leaders and their advisors and of American analysts are likely to ...

15. Conclusions

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pp. 157-166

Notes

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pp. 167-180

Bibliography

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pp. 181-187

Index

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pp. 188-193