Affect and Artificial Intelligence

Notes

133 Notes Preface Chapter epigraph: Bruno Latour, “Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern,” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004): 248. 1 See, for example, Michael Lewis and Jeannette Haviland-Jones’s Handbook of Emotions (1993); Jaak Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience (1998); Joseph LeDoux’s The Emotional Brain (1998); Richard Lane and Lynn Nadel’s Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion (2000); Susan Greenfield’s The Private Life of the Brain (2002); and the special issue of Brain and Cognition (2003; vol. 52) on affective neuroscience. Oxford University Press launched the new journal Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience in 2005, and it has been publishing books on neuroscience and emotion in the successful Series in Affective Science since 1995. 2 See, for example, Daniel Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence (1995); Dylan Evans’s Emotion: The Science of Sentiment (2001); Paul Ekman’s Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life (2003). 3 See, for example, Rosalind Picard’s Affective Computing (1997); Rodney Brooks’s Flesh and Machines (2002); Cynthia Breazeal’s Designing Sociable Robots (2002); Robert Trappi, Paola Petta, and Sabine Payr’s edited anthology Emotions in Humans and Artifacts (2002); Kerstin Dautenhahn, Alan Bond, Lola Cañamero, and Bruce Edmond’s edited anthology Socially Intelligent Agents: Creating Relationships with Computers and Robots (2002); Craig DeLancey’s Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence (2002); Jean-Marc Fellous and Michael Arbib’s Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Robot (2005); Marvin Minksy’s The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind (2006); and Sherry Turkle’s Evocative Objects: Things We Think With (2008). 4 There are already a number of excellent histories of this period. In particular, Steve Heims (1991) and Kate Hayles (1999) have written in depth on the immediate post-war developments in AI and cybernetics, and I have relied heavily on these texts while researching this project. 5 Similar argument can be found in Sherry Turkle’s Second Self (1984) and Life 134 Notes to Preface and Introduction on the Screen (1995) and in Lucy Suchman’s Plans and Situated Action (1987) and Human-Machine Reconfigurations (2007). 6 In parallel with the sciences, researchers in the humanities have been investigating the importance of the affects in contemporary life. Much of this work comes in the wake of Sedgwick and Frank’s 1995 influential introduction to Silvan Tomkins’s affect theory. See, for example, Rei Terada’s Feeling in Theory (2003); Ann Cvetkovich’s An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures (2003); Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2003); Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect (2004); Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings (2005); Elspeth Probyn’s Blush: Faces of Shame (2005); Denise Riley’s Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect (2005); Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects (2007); Lauren Berlant ’s The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture (2008); Kathleen Woodward’s Statistical Panic: Cultural Politics and Poetics of the Emotions (2009). 7 In her introduction to the anthology Novel Gazing, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes in a somewhat exasperated tone about the state of contemporary critical and cultural analysis. Her concern is that criticism has become too paranoid. While a certain amount of paranoia or suspicion is necessary to any critical endeavour, Sedgwick regrets that it has become our primary means of intellectual engagement with the world: “It seems to me a great loss when paranoid inquiry comes to seem entirely coextensive with critical theoretical inquiry, rather than being viewed as one kind of cognitive/affective practice among other, alternative kinds” (Sedgwick 1997, 6). Introduction: The Machine Has No Fear 1 A number of excellent critical and cultural studies of the child have been published recently (e.g., Castañeda 2002, Edelman 2004, Mavor 2007, Stockton 2009). The extent to which the child-computer is part of the same logic that governs fleshy children would require extensive investigation and would no doubt focus more on contemporary AI and HCI than this book is able to do. See Suchman (2007) and Keller (2007) for commentaries on the deployment of childhood in contemporary robotics. 2 See Mialet (2003) for a fascinating counter-example of this critical tendency; she gives an account of the entanglement of abstraction and embodiment in an encounter with Stephen Hawking. 3 Details of the 1996 and 1997 games can be found at the IBM Web site: http:// www.research.ibm.com/deepblue...