Antiphon and Andocides

3. Second Tetralogy

3. SECOND TETRALOGY Some young men were practicing javelin-throwing, when a boy who ran out on the field to pick up the javelins was accidentally struck and killed. The young man who threw the javelin is now charged with unintentional homicide (which would be tried in Athens at the Palladium by the Ephetae); the penalty is exile for a limited period, perhaps a year. Plutarch (Pericles 36.3) reports that after a competitor was killed in a similar situation, Pericles and Protagoras spent an entire day discussing whether the javelin or the thrower or the organizers of the contest were responsible for his death ‘‘according to the most correct argument’’ (logos). Whether or not an actual incident gave rise to these discussions, the story indicates that the issue of cause and responsibility with regard to accidents occupied the attention of intellectuals at this time. In contrast to the First Tetralogy, the facts of this case are not in dispute; because of this, the plaintiff at first assumes there is no question about the verdict, but the defendant presents what he himself admits is a very subtle argument (3.2.2), that his son is not responsible for the boy’s death since the boy is responsible for his own death. Antiphon seems to be indicating that the plaintiff presents the normal or traditional view of this sort of case, whereas the defendant’s arguments represent new, sophisticated reasoning that may be viewed with suspicion by many. The defendant’s argument rests on a complex assessment of each person’s behavior by comparison with the behavior of others in the same situation: the young man did the same thing as the other young men who were throwing javelins, but the boy behaved differently from the other bystanders, who did not run out on the field. By setting the issue in terms of mistake (hamartia) and by comparing the two parties’ actions to those of others at the scene, Antiphon comes close to a modern concept of negligence in terms of a ‘‘reasonable man’’ standard of behavior. We could also see the issue as the legal and moral responsibility for an act of which a person is (to use modern terms) a necessary but not a sufficient cause (cf. Arist.,Nicomachaean Ethics 3.1–5).Athenian law almost certainly did not lay down precise guidelines for such situations, and it is unclear what conclusions jurors would reach if this were a real case. 3.1 [1] When the facts are agreed on by both sides, the verdict is determined by the laws and by those who voted,1 who have final authority over our government; but if there is disagreement on any matter, it is your duty, citizens, to decide. In this case I think even the defendant will not disagree with me; for my boy,2 struck in the side on the training field by a javelin thrown by this young man, died on the spot. I therefore charge him not with intentional but with unintentional homicide. [2] For me, of course, the misfortune he unintentionally caused is just as great as if he had acted intentionally; he has not burdened the spirit of the dead man but of those still living. So I beg you, pity the parents’ loss of their child, mourn for the deceased’s unseasonable death, ban the killer from the places prescribed in the law,3 and do not ignore the pollution he has brought on the whole city. 3.2 [1] It is now clear that misfortune and need force even those who mind their own business4 to appear in court, to grow bold though 3. second tetralogy 31 1 This seems to mean ‘‘those who voted in the Assembly to approve the laws’’; but the expression is unclear and the text may be damaged. 2 ‘‘Boy’’ and ‘‘young man’’ are used consistently to distinguish the two; the latter is perhaps 16 or 17 years old, the former several years younger. 3 Athenian law specified several public and religious places, including the Agora, where the lawcourts were, as off limits to those formally accused or convicted of homicide. 4 The topos (cf. above, 1.1n) of ‘‘minding one’s own business’’ (apragmōn) is commonly contrasted with the ‘‘busybody’’ (polypragmōn), who is excessively fond of litigation. they are normally quiet, and in general to speak and act against their...