Isocrates I

Against the Sophists

13. AGAINST THE SOPHISTS introduction This short work gives a quick, opening snapshot of Isocrates’ career as a teacher of politics, culture, and public speaking. It was probably written about 390. Its program shows a remarkable similarity to that of Antidosis (15), which was written thirty-five years later, but the goals of the two works are different. Later on, Isocrates will be on the defensive , defending his career and pleading for the importance of his contribution to Athenian life and politics. In this work he is more polemical; he wants to open up a space for himself and his teaching and distance himself from other teachers. Unlike Encomium of Helen (10), to whose beginning this work is also similar, Against the Sophists does not name names—no doubt a conscious rhetorical strategy. But we can sometimes reconstruct the teaching systems of some of Isocrates’ competitors from his criticisms: their use of mock debates, model speeches, and so on. Clearly Isocrates is assuming—perhaps he is also developing—some of the technical vocabulary that is used by other sophists, such as kairos and to prepon (13), idea and enthymēma (16), and eidē (17), although he disdainfully rejects other terminology (19). It has generally been thought that his statement of his own teaching method, which seems to be introduced in the final chapter, has been lost. This view has recently been challenged by Too, who argues that Isocrates purposefully did not express it; see also Papillon 1995. 13. against the sophists [1] If all those who undertook to teach were willing to speak the truth and not make greater promises than they plan to fulfill, they would not have such a bad reputation among the general public. But as it is now, those who dare to make boasts with too little caution have made it appear that those who choose to take it easy are better advised than those who apply themselves to philosophy. Who would not hate and despise first and foremost those who spend their time in disputes,1 pretending to seek the truth but attempting from the beginning of their lessons to lie? [2] I think it clear to all that it is not in our nature to know in advance what is going to happen. We fall so far short of this intelligence that Homer, who enjoys the highest reputation for wisdom, has written that the gods sometimes debate about the future —not because he knows their thoughts but because he wants to show us that this one thing (i.e., knowledge of the future) is impossible for human beings.2 [3] Now these people have become so bold that they try to persuade the young that if they study with them they will know what they need to do and through this knowledge they will become happy.3 And once they have established themselves as teachers and masters of such great goods, they are not ashamed to demand only three or four minas for them. [4] If they were selling some other property for such a small fraction of its worth, they would not dispute that their reasoning is faulty. And although they value all of moral excellence and happiness so little, nevertheless they still claim to be sensible teachers of others. They say they have no need for money, disparaging wealth as ‘‘mere silver and gold,’’ but in their desire for a little profit they almost promise to make their students immortal. What is most ridiculous of all is [5] that they distrust those from whom they have to get this small profit—those to whom they intend to impart their sense of justice—and they deposit the fees from their students with men whom they have never taught. They are well advised to do this in regard to their security, but it is the opposite of what they teach. [6] It is all right for those teaching anything else to be careful over important 62 isocrates i 1 I.e., eristic arguments. Plato discusses several kinds in Sophist 225–226. 2 That the gods deliberate about the future shows that they do not know the future, and if the gods do not, how can humans? Aristotle (Rhetoric 2.23.4) uses this argument to illustrate the topos of ‘‘the more and the less,’’ that is, a fortiori reasoning. 3 According to Theophrastus, who is quoted by Athenaeus 567A, Cleomander of Cyrene promised to teach how to achieve good fortune (eutychia...