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170 170 e i g h t SUCCESS AND FAILURE: THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT ( JNM) 1956–1957 People say of his [Nabulsi’s] government that there were eleven prime ministers and one minister. mo r aiw id al-tell1 And I think, now I think, we were—the whole group—the nationalists, at that time, the opposition, at that time, were not wise enough to deal with the matters at that time. You know, that at that time, Nasser was there and everybody was very enthusiastic, very nationalist and so on, and they didn’t, this is now, after forty years, I think of it now, we were not wise enough to take things slowly and carefully and step by step. yaq u b ziyadin 2 I say today that some of the officials in the period of my government acted rashly and with heedlessness. su layman al-nabu lsi, as reported by hist o r ian su layman musa3 The period between October 1956 and April 1957 saw the political climax and then the fall of the Jordanian National Movement ( JNM) as a unified political actor on the Jordanian scene.4 Because of its enormous popularity , King Husayn appointed one of its leaders, Sulayman al-Nabulsi, to serve as prime minister of Jordan’s first nationalist government. Sheer momentum had brought the parties to power, riding on the waves of emotions and songs and demonstrations. The “new” had finally arrived to displace the “old.” As the JNM’s leaders had promised for years, the T3118.indb 170 T3118.indb 170 1/4/05 12:56:59 PM 1/4/05 12:56:59 PM s u c c e s s a n d f a i l u r e 171 opportunity now existed to institute the policies of the Arab nationalist and progressive movement in Jordan. The state fought to oppose these measures. The two national identities had now come head-to-head in a struggle to see who could “win,” who could control the apparatus of government and the hearts of the citizenry. Those same old questions kept reappearing in new forms and voiced by new people: What nationalism would emerge on the Jordanian political scene? What kind of government would truly represent the new forces in the society? Once in power, the JNM faced innumerable difficulties, both because of its own inherent weaknesses and the strength represented by the pillars of the Hashemite regime. The JNM, once in power, found that the nationalized solution it had always put forward as the panacea for Jordan’s ills proved too simplistic; this solution did not build electricity lines or schools, or employ those alienated urban migrants. The Hashemite national narrative still had not captured the hearts of much of the population , but the Hashemite regime itself had proven that it could spread the largesse if required. The JNM had put forward “new” hopes but then could not fulfill expectations once in power. The state may not have kept pace with the changes so much of the population was experiencing, but many groups in the society had come to expect the steady spread of state services. In a basic way, the Hashemite regime had come to “fulfill the normalizing mission of the modern state” as the population granted it legitimacy. In the surrounding Arab states, compatriots of the JNM’s leaders initiated military coups to generate that revolutionary feeling and then found themselves locked in the same bind: how to solve the endemic socioeconomic problems of a changing society. The leaders of the JNM tried to work this revolution from inside the government, but also failed. They did not remain in power long enough to actually initiate many domestic policies, but their previous work had generated such enthusiasm for their rule that their supporters expected miraculous changes. Simultaneously, outside powers—the United States, Britain, Egypt, Syria—to name just a few, intervened and further weakened the Movement . Jordan does not have the natural resources to survive on its own, unaided by outside powers. From its very inception, the state required a steady infusion of cash and material aid from the British; to continue to exist, the state needed new alliances or unions with the surrounding countries. Egypt and Syria promised that aid and laid open the possibility that union would be the best solution for the country’s problems. On the other side, the British and then the United States proffered their support for the Hashemite state...

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