Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness

Twelve: Ethical and Moral Issues in Intelligence Reform: The Philippines

twelve ethical and moral issues in intelligence reform The Philippines Douglas J. Macdonald This nation is at a crossroad: quite simply, it must reform or perish. —filipino president gloria macapagal-arroyo R eform of security services in emerging democracies is one of the most important tasks facing these governments in the process of democratization.1 This chapter will examine the tortuous road to intelligence and military reform since the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines in 1986. The Marcos period (1965–1986) was marked by an unprecedented politicization and corruption of the civilian and military security forces of the Philippines , the primary producers of intelligence. This legacy has been and will remain one of the greatest barriers to meaningful reform of democratic institutions and intelligence services. Two fundamental approaches to reform are contrasted: the ‘‘top-down,’’ widespread, wholesale reforms aimed at the complete transformation of the security forces simultaneously attempted by the Corazon Aquino government (1986–1992), and the incremental ‘‘bottom-up’’ reforms attempted by its successor, the government of President Fidel Ramos (1992–1998). In addition, the Ramos administration proceeded with a series of creative diplomatic and socioeconomic initiatives that were crucial to its relative success. As additional important elements in this success, Ramos served in a period of relative prosperity in the region of Southeast Asia and, as a former military man, was not the object of suspicion from that quarter, as was President Aquino. Although both the top-down and bottom-up approaches have their strengths and weaknesses , and implementation of intelligence reform as one aspect of broader democratic reforms has been imperfect, the incremental approach utilized by Ramos is the superior strategy in pressing for intelligence reform in the Philippines. douglas j. macdonald some inherent cultural obstacles to reform The Philippines, an archipelago of some 7,107 mountainous islands spread over 500,000 square miles, has long been a dissonant nation with strong centrifugal political and social dynamics, especially those between Manila and the rest of country. There is a strong sense of localism, and the various provinces have a tradition of notable local families who dominate the economics, politics, and social activities in their areas.2 Since World War II, and especially after independence in 1946, many of the notable families have kept private armies to prevent anyone from challenging the socioeconomic status quo and to protect their power prerogatives. They have always been a source of challenge to the power of the state—under the Spanish, under the Americans, and since independence. Indeed, a recent book about Filipino political culture referred to it without too much overstatement as ‘‘an anarchy of families.’’3 This localism has fortified a strongly personality-driven, patron-client form of political culture and institutional behavior where loyalty to the family, faction, or friend often takes precedence over loyalty to the state or to abstract principles such as merit or legality.4 For example, in the 1970s, the U.S. government estimated that about four hundred families essentially controlled the economy and politics of the country.5 Data today are hard to pinpoint; however, the situation is relatively unchanged. According to this view, the family—which is most often used in the sense of clan, as Filipinos have unusually broad inclusion standards for familial ties—is a hindrance to the creation of a strong national identity. Thus for geographical, cultural, and historical reasons a political culture evolved with institutions not unlike those of many other Third World countries with economicallyand politically powerful elite families: a ‘‘strong society and weak state.’’6 This has led to a history of localist rebellions at the popular and elite levels of society against the rule from Manila, from a variety of rationales.7 With this historical legacy, it may not be surprising that Filipino society is so prone to violence, even by Third World standards. Yet the power and influence of the notable families are not limited to their provincial strongholds. The families have long dominated the government in Manila, and they have at times been shameless in using public institutions for private gain for themselves, their families, and their allies. This hierarchical, oligarchic system, with its shifting alliances and violence-prone politics, creates a very weak political party system, 302 ethical and moral issues with personality-driven political dynasties dominating the Congress and other political institutions, including the uniformed intelligence services.8 Changing allegiances bears no stigma...