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Four. Launching the War on Poverty in Texas [Includes Photo Inserts]
- University of Texas Press
- Chapter
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F o u r The battery of programs introduced by the OEO, presented as a bewildering list of acronyms, confused local officials when the War on Poverty came to the Lone Star State. In Brownsville the Cameron County Commissioners’ Court invited the local press to a discussion of the unfolding fight on poverty. County Judge Oscar C. Dancy’s understanding of the OEO’s role reflected that of many local officials in Texas: “I’m in favor of cooperating with the President and the governor as far as we can on this poverty thing . . . The beautification of highways, parks, seems to be the first on the President’s program .”1 Dancy and many others seemed to believe that LBJ intended more or less to revive the New Deal. When a reporter asked the judge, “Is it a make work program, like the WPA was?” Dancy replied, “Yes, I would say it is, at least I think.”2 In March 1965 Texas Congressman Wright Patman wrote to Shriver to find out what the OEO was up to. Gillis Long, who had replaced Yarmolinsky as Shriver’s assistant, informed Patman that “the problems and range of alternative actions in waging a successful War against Poverty are infinite,” but the OEO proposed to “provide the opportunities for that one-fifth of our population who are not now capable of maintaining even a minimum standard of living, to participate in the economic growth of the nation—at least to the extent that their basic needs can be satisfied.”3 Long went on to explain each title of the Economic Opportunity Act specifically, emphasizing the provisions in the act that created opportunities for youth. launching theWar on Poverty inteas Launching the War on Poverty in Texas 1 Patman, a longtime member of the House of Representatives who had voted for the EOA, probably already knew everything Long told him. Most likely, Patman wrote Shriver to learn more about the mechanics of the War on Poverty. The director’s assistant avoided answering nuts-and-bolts questions. How much money would be available? How would the money be distributed ? What role would local and state government have in the poverty war? What was community action? Would members of Congress have any input? It would have been difficult, however, for Long to address such questions in early 1965 because no one could foresee how the OEO would function on the local level. a h o m e t o W N F I g h t Most local officials learned about the War on Poverty from the newspapers. In late 1964 and 1965 the OEO issued press releases to explain how to apply for War on Poverty funds. A press release titled “The War on Poverty—A Hometown Fight” stated that “individual communities will do the job with private and public resources that will be augmented by this new federal assistance .”4 Communities received guidance on how to measure poverty in their areas, on what sort of programs might be developed, on what programs the OEO was developing in Washington, and on the application process for CAP grants.5 This began what Matusow called a “wild scramble” to develop local Community Action Agencies.6 The theorists who had conceived community action during the Kennedy administration cautioned local groups to spend at least one year in program development.7 Wanting to get the money before LBJ or members of Congress changed their minds, local officials devoted little time to developing an understanding of the subtleties of community action. By June 1965 more than four hundred CAAs had been established. By 1966 there were more than one thousand.8 The OEO gave communities some leeway on program development but required local CAAs to follow a few directives. The most famous and controversial requirement was that CAAs employ the “maximum feasible participation ” of the poor. For Johnson and the OEO, maximum feasible participation simply meant self-help. Shriver wrote in 1964 that the War on Poverty was founded on a “commitment to ensure that the poor themselves actively participate in the planning, implementation, and administration.”9 The OEO’s annual report for 1965, The Quiet Revolution, indicates that CAP policy makers envisioned the poor offering input in the development of “a wide variety of [18.117.251.51] Project MUSE (2024-04-17 22:20 GMT) 2 Freedom Is Not Enough services generated locally to help the poor help themselves.”10 Beyond such vague notions, the OEO provided few specifics...