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1 7 7 C H A P T E R 8 A Tale of Two Elections The Reform Front in Iran and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey have been the most prominent post-Islamist movements in the Middle East. Neither the RF nor the JDP shared a holistic ideological vision that left little room for pluralism and democratic governance. In fact, the birth of the RF and the JDP followed internal debates and criticism regarding the promises of the Islamist ideology. The Iranian Revolution resulted in authoritarian rule that suffered from chronic socioeconomic problems. The central theme of the RF’s discourse was the increasing gap between revolutionary ideals and the reality of the Islamic Republic. The RF developed a powerful criticism of the state-centric nature of Islamist ideology and offered an alternative vision emphasizing civil society, rule of law, and societal rights and freedoms. Despite the broad appeal of its platform, it failed to become the dominant force in Iran for two reasons. Primarily, and consistent with Proposition IVr (see Table 2.1) that problematizes the relationship between behavioral moderation and democratic progress, the RF did not pursue a nonelectoral confrontational strategy of political change. Second, it did not have the means to implement policies of social welfare and to weaken the state’s control over economic production and distribution. A central reason for the victory of Ahmedinejad in the June 2005 presidential election was widespread discontent caused by chronic inflation, unemployment, underemployment, corruption, and lack of economic opportunities. Ironically, broad segments of the Iranian society perceived Ahmedinejad as an “outsider” who would reform the corrupt and wasteful system and fulfill the social justice message of the revolution. Turkish Islamists had a very unique trajectory, as they had regularly participated in elections since the early 1970s. A younger generation of Islamists, backed by liberals, developed a criticism of Islamism and of the secularist ruling ideology since the early 1990s. They took advantage of electoral opportunities and public discontent caused by socioeconomic downturn. The JDP, M U S L I M R E F O R M E R S I N I R A N A N D T U R K E Y 1 7 8 founded in 2001, was more successful than its Iranian counterpart in holding on to power and generating significant political change. Turkey’s historical aspiration to join the European Union, the hegemony of the IMF-dictated neoliberal economic policies, and the public discrediting of opposition parties facilitated the rise of the JDP. It also had superior organizational resources; its poverty-alleviation policies solidified its support among the working class and the poor; and its economic policies favoring the private sector cultivated support among businesspeople. Nonetheless, its ability and willingness to address the issues most critical for Turkish democratic consolidation—the recognition of the rights of historically discriminated-against groups and the containment of counterinsurgency-related groups operating beyond the rule of law—remained very limited despite historical opportunities. A solid understanding of democratization and de-democratization in Iran and Turkey requires a systematic analysis of how state power is configured and exercised in these two countries. This implies focusing on darker aspects of state-society relations that rarely come into public and academic view. State power mostly remains beyond public accountability and transparency in both countries. Popularly elected governments do not have substantial control over violent and clandestine groups acting with impunity. These “internal security ” organizations are principal agents that hinder political reform. Neither the RF nor the JDP managed to completely curb the influence of these organizations and establish partial control over their activities. Yet they achieved more success in this regard when they were willing to directly confront these organizations through legal and judicial channels at the risk of alienating the guardians, which often offered tacit or explicit protection to the clandestine organizations. This chapter provides an empirically grounded discussion of the 2007 Turkish parliamentary and the 2008 Iranian parliamentary elections. It contributes to a better understanding of the limits of an electoral strategy of reform. While elections change the balance of governmental and legislative power, electoral victories do not necessarily diminish the political influence of the guardians. Constitutional amendments and widespread administrative and legal reform may be necessary but insufficient steps for dismantling guardianship . For instance, the EU reform process has substantially decreased the institutional power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and made the Turkish legal system more compatible with liberal-democratic principles. However, [3.144...

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