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172 conclusion In January 2011 the international public discovered the corruption of Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abidin Ben Ali (1987–2011); his wife, Leila Trabelsi; and their respective families, who had monopolized the nation’s political and economic life for a substantial portion of his 23-year rule. In a number of respects, they perpetuated the worst attributes of a royal family: they built sumptuous palaces, flaunted their wealth, were immune to legal sanction, and used family connections for economic privileges.1 In fact, before his deposition, many believed that Ben Ali was preparing to create a hereditary dynasty by passing on his position to his son-in-law Sakher al-Materi. Yet while the influence of the Ben Ali–Trabelsi clan suggests the importance of family to political life, similar to what I have described under the beys in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this minimalizes the profound differences between the two. Ben Ali’s power stemmed largely from the dominant role of the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally party (known by its French acronym, the RCD) and the traditions of the single-party state developed under the first president Habib Bourguiba (1956–1987). His authority was maintained through very modern technologies of surveillance and control from the bloated police force used to harass dissidents, infiltrate civil society organizations, and intimidate the population to a vast infrastructure of internet censorship, which severely curtailed online critiques of his regime and limited freedom of expression , as well as the acquiescence of vast sectors of the population.2 Ben Ali was at least superficially accepted as a democratic sovereign in international diplomatic circles, praised by the International Monetary Fund for Tunisia’s financial accomplishments, considered a reliable partner by the European Union, and viewed as a strategic ally in the War on Terror. While none of this protected his regime from the challenges posed by increasing socioeconomic and regional disparities, public resentment, and the estrangement of the military, they indicate that any connections with conclusion 173 the familial nature of the state in the Ottoman period are either anecdotal or anachronistic. This is not to contrast a corrupt or violent modern state with a harmonious and egalitarian Ottoman past, for such a nostalgic rendering of Tunisian society under the beys overlooks how state and society were clearly hierarchical and profoundly authoritarian.Though political power was accessible to the entire governing family, shared among the bey and his ministers, an inner circle made decisions with little accountability. Resources were confiscated for personal use at various points along the political spectrum and irregularly invested towards public good. If the practice of consultation was valued by some (Hammuda Pasha Bey, Ahmad Bey) more likely to consult with the ʿulamaʾ, or more accepting of a divergence of opinion, it was disparaged by others (Muhammad al-Sadoq Bey). Finally, while women were able to contribute to the economic and political strength of the ruling family, their actions did not shake its patriarchal foundations. As indicated by generations of marriage alliances between the palace, the political elite, and the ʿulamaʾ, and the social networks linking Bardo to urban society, the palace families were keenly attuned to the importance of being accepted by provincial society. Women contributed to establishing and maintaining local ties, just as they factored into beylical relations with foreign powers. Over the course of the nineteenth century, women’s status was increasingly a barometer by which foreigners judged Tunisian civilization. Since the foreign resident community had few contacts beyond governing circles, these assessments relied considerably upon impressions of the palace. Attentive to the political ramifications of social interactions, the beys presented themselves as monogamous, and provincial notables had their wives dine with foreign guests. Family life informed how Ottomans, Muslims, and Orientals of all social backgrounds were written about in travelogues, academic studies, and the European press, some of which circulated in Tunis even before the colonial era. Not only was women’s status a way to measure men’s attributes and the advancement of civilizations, but such critiques often stigmatized Islamic law because of the husband’s right to universal repudiation and the practice of polygamy. By the late nineteenth century, Arab and Ottoman intellectuals responded to these stereotypes in deliberating how state modernization projects applied to the family, household managements, gender roles, the marital couple, and child rearing. Such debates in newspapers, pamphlets, and published books incorpo- [3.19.31.73] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 22:15 GMT) 174 Women, Gender, and the...

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