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Chapter 2: Feminism, Method, and Rawlsian Abstraction
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As indicated in the introduction to this volume, Rawls has been enormously influential in contemporary political philosophy, and his ideas and methods continue to shape philosophical debates about justice, liberty, equality, autonomy, and democracy. Given the centrality of Rawlsian concepts to these debates, feminist political theorists must consider how and whether Rawls’s work can be employed for feminist ends. Because he moves beyond a narrow focus on individuals and emphasizes the importance of the “basic structure” of society, Rawls’s theory of justice—and his later work on political liberalism—may appear promising to feminists seeking to rectify inequalities in society’s institutions and structures of power. In this chapter I raise a number of problems with feminist attempts to use Rawls’s work to argue for feminist conclusions. My specific interest is in 2 Feminism, Method, and Rawlsian Abstraction Lisa H. Schwartzman 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 40 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 40 7/25/13 9:43 AM 7/25/13 9:43 AM Feminism, Method, and Rawlsian Abstraction 41 the question of whether an abstract, ideal theory like Rawls’s, where we are instructed to think from the OP, is an effective feminist strategy, and I conclude that it is not. I begin by examining Susan Okin’s suggestion that Rawls’s theory of justice can be reformulated in ways that hold great potential for feminism. I argue that Okin’s feminist reformulation of Rawls depends on two assumptions: (a) that the parties in the OP must think from the perspective of persons living in the actual social positions of our current society, and (b) that the parties know that women are subordinated in current society and recent history, and that they understand the experience of gender oppression. I argue not only that these assumptions are contrary to Rawls’s own description of the OP, but also that they are precluded by the sort of idealized theorizing that Rawls advocates. While I think that Okin is correct to suggest that we learn a great deal by thinking about what women would agree to, and by thinking from the perspective of the most subordinated social groups, I find unconvincing her arguments that Rawls provides us with many resources to aid in this project. In the final sections, I raise further problems with assumptions that both Okin and Rawls make about the “pluralism” of views that would exist in a wellordered society, and I suggest that some of these assumptions take for granted the continuation of structures of oppression. I conclude by suggesting that feminism requires identifying and challenging socially generated hierarchies of power, which Rawls’s methodology is ill equipped to do, given its understanding of power, equality, and social position. Okin’s Feminist Reformulation of Rawls As the introduction to this volume makes clear, Okin acknowledges many problems with PL (Okin 1994). However, as also indicated there, she believed that some of the basic ideas presented in TJ held great promise for feminism: “The original position, with the veil of ignorance hiding from its participants their sex as well as their other particular characteristics, talents, circumstances, and aims, is a powerful concept for challenging the gender structure” (JGF, 108–9). Because persons in the OP know that they could end up as women, they would not agree to women’s subordinate status in the family, workplace, or any other sociopolitical institution. Okin contends that “a consistent and wholehearted application of Rawls’s liberal principles of justice can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of our society” (JGF, 89). Although Rawls does not mention ignorance of one’s sex in his initial description of the veil of ignorance, he adds 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 41 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 41 7/25/13 9:43 AM 7/25/13 9:43 AM [3.238.107.238] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 16:13 GMT) 42 Feminist Interpretations of John Rawls sex—along with race—to the list of unknown features in his 1975 essay “Fairness to Goodness,” which suggests that his theory could be used to challenge sex and race inequalities. Departing from Rawls’s communitarian and feminist critics, Okin argues that his theory does not require an egoistic and individualistic subject who thinks only about impartial and universalist principles. Although Rawls’s use of the language of rational choice suggests this reading, Okin claims that “the original position and what happens there are described far better in other terms” (JGF, 101). In particular, the parties would have to act...