Feminist Interpretations of John Rawls

Chapter 8: Liberal Feminism: Comprehensive and Political

As we have seen in the introduction to this volume, in PL Rawls argues for a turn in political philosophy from conceiving liberalism as a comprehensive moral doctrine to conceiving it as a public political philosophy. This reflects the conviction that coercive state action is justified—when constitutional essentials and basic justice are at stake—only if supported by “public reasons” (PL, 227–30). Public reasons are not the particular reasons of any one comprehensive moral doctrine. They are reasons sharable by the many reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines citizens hold. Some This chapter is dedicated to my mother, Annie Baehr. For helpful discussion, thanks are due to Andrew Altman, Asha Bandary, Christie Hartley, Kevin Melchionne, Ira Singer, Kathleen Wallace, Lori Watson, Hofstra University’s philosophy colloquium, and the Long Island Philosophical Society. 8 Liberal Feminism Comprehensive and Political Amy R. Baehr 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 150 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 150 7/25/13 9:43 AM 7/25/13 9:43 AM Liberal Feminism 151 feminist liberals have recommended that feminists develop feminism as a public political philosophy (Baehr 2008; Brake 2004; Hartley and Watson 2010; Lloyd 1998, 209–210; McClain 2006; Nussbaum 2000a, 56; Nussbaum 2003, 511). Feminism as a public political philosophy—which I call “public political feminism”—is a set of feminist ends along with the public reasons that support them.1 What does the possibility of public political feminism mean for liberal feminism? Is liberal feminism to be identified with public political feminism ? I suggest here that Rawls’s comprehensive-political distinction makes possible a complex account of liberal feminism. According to this account, liberal feminism can be a comprehensive moral doctrine.2 This is how it is commonly portrayed. But also, as I suggest above, liberal feminism can be a public political philosophy. If liberal feminism can be a public political philosophy, then one can count as a liberal feminist even if one rejects liberal feminism as a comprehensive doctrine. Say that you reject liberal feminism as a comprehensive doctrine because you endorse some other comprehensive feminist doctrine, for example, Jewish feminism, or ecofeminism . As long as your Jewish feminism or ecofeminism gives you reason to endorse public political feminism, you count as a kind of liberal feminist. It is an open question whether there are nonliberal feminist comprehensive doctrines that give adherents reason to endorse public political feminism (or whether there could be after a period of reflection and revision ). I do not establish here that there are any. But if there are, then the liberal feminist tent is broadened. This complex account of liberal feminism leads us to ask about the relationship between comprehensive feminist doctrines and feminism as a public political philosophy. While I conjecture that there are nonliberal feminist comprehensive doctrines that give adherents reason to endorse public political feminism, I argue in this chapter that there is at least one liberal feminist comprehensive doctrine that fails to provide such a reason. This seems counterintuitive and ought to be of interest to those of us who would like to hold liberal feminism both as a comprehensive doctrine and as a public political philosophy. If one is to hold them both, then there will have to be a comprehensive liberal feminism that has reasons for public political feminism. In the first section below, I discuss the relationship between comprehensive doctrines and public political philosophy generally. I show that endorsement of public political feminism is not a rejection of the many feminist comprehensive doctrines, though it is a constraint on them. If one endorses public political feminism, then one may hold only a feminist 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 151 18442-Abbey_FemInterp_Rawls.indd 151 7/25/13 9:43 AM 7/25/13 9:43 AM 152 Feminist Interpretations of John Rawls comprehensive doctrine that has a reason for the limits of public reason. In the second section, I give a sketch of public political feminism. I focus on its ends and the public reasons for them. In the third section, I explore a kind of comprehensive liberal feminism that does not provide its adherents with reasons for endorsing public political feminism as the correct account of the coercive uses of state power to feminist ends. I also make the related point that this feminism is susceptible to three serious feminist criticisms. In the fourth section, I present a different comprehensive liberal feminism, one that has a reason for endorsing public political feminism and...