A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century: Updated and Revised Edition

Chapter 7: The “Process,” 1976–1983

The Terrorist State On March 24, 1976, the Junta commanders-in-chief, General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Air Force Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agosti, assumed power. They immediately issued the legal instruments of the so-called Process of National Reorganization and designated General Videla president of the nation; he also continued as army commander until 1978. The economic crisis of 1975, the crisis in leadership, the factional struggles and the daily presence of death, the spectacular actions of the guerrilla organizations —which had failed in two major operations against military installations in the provinces of Buenos Aires and Formosa—the terror sown by the Triple A, all created the conditions for the acceptance of a military coup that promised to reestablish order and ensure the state’s monopoly on violence. The program of the military—which had done little to prevent the chaos from reaching this extreme—went beyond these goals and consisted of eliminating the root of the problem, which according to its diagnosis was found in society itself and in the unresolved nature of society’s conflicts. The nature of the proposed solution could be read in the metaphors employed by the seven The “Process,” 1976–1983 . . . . . 215 new government to describe that society—sickness, tumor, surgical removal, major surgery—all summed up in one proposal that was unambiguous and conclusive: The military had come to cut the Gordian knot with a sword. Thecuttingwiththeswordwasinrealityanintegraloperationofterror,carefully planned by the leadership of the three service branches, rehearsed first in Tucumán—wherethearmyofficiallyintervenedin1975—andthenexecutedin asystematicfashionthroughoutthecountry.Thesewerethe1984findingsofthe Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (National Commission of Disappeared Persons, or CONADEP) created by President Raúl Alfonsín in 1984 and then by the justice system that found the military guilty and condemned many of its members to prison. The military commanders concentrated in their hands all the activities of this operation; the various paramilitary groups that had been operating in the years before the coup were dissolved and incorporated into the government’s state terrorist machinery. The three branchesofthemilitaryassignedthemselvesdifferentareasofresponsibilityand even maintained a certain degree of competition between one another to show whowasthemosteffective,acompetitionthatgavetheiroperationsananarchic and factional character. Nonetheless, such anarchy did not mean that the terrorismunleashedwasbychanceandlackedsupervision ,aviewthatformedpart of the general population’s conception of the horrendous operation. The general planning and tactical supervision were in the hands of the highest levels of military leadership, and the ranking officers did not refrain from personally participating in the acts, a fact that highlighted the institutional character of the policy and the military’s collective commitment to it. Orders came down through the chain of command until reaching those entrusted with carrying out the actions, the so-called Task Groups—principally young military officers, along with some noncommissioned officers, civilians, and off-duty police—who also had their own organization. The execution of their acts required a complex administrative apparatus because they were supposed to follow the movement—the entries, moves, and departures—of a vast array of people. Anyone arrested, from the moment he or she entered the list of suspects, was assigned his or her own number and file, with a followup , an evaluation of the case, after which a final decision would be taken, which always was the preserve of the highest levels of the military. The repression was, in sum, a systematic action carried out by the state. A Histor y of Argentina in the Twentieth Centur y 216 . . . . . The acts of terror were divided into four principal moments: abduction, torture, arrest, and execution. For the abductions, each group organized for that purpose—commonly known as “the gang” (la patota)—preferred to operate at night, to arrive at the victims’ homes, with the family as witnesses; in many cases, family members became victims themselves in the operation. But many arrests also occurred in factories or workplaces or in the street, and sometimes in neighboring countries, with the collaboration of local authorities . Such operations were realized in unmarked but well-recognized cars— the ominous green Ford Falcons were the favorite—a lavish display of men and arms, combining anonymity with ostentation, all of which heightened the desired terrorizing effect. The kidnapping was followed by ransacking the home, a practice that was subsequently refined so that the victims were forced to surrender their furniture and other possessions, which became the booty of the horrendous operation. The fate of...