Empowerment and Interconnectivity: Toward a Feminist History of Utilitarian Philosophy

Introduction: Empowerment and Interconnectivity: Toward a Feminist History of Utilitarian Philosophy

introduction .................................................................................................. Empowerment and Interconnectivity: Toward a Feminist History of Utilitarian Philosophy The central figures in this book are all nineteenth-century utilitarians of one stripe or another. They also have in common the fact that they have been seen as feminist, although they do not all share the same type of feminist views. Two of them—Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill—are major figures in our Western philosophical canon. Others—Anna Doyle Wheeler, William Thompson, Frances Wright, and Catherine Beecher—are on the margins of our history of philosophy, their work neglected or their philosophical substance questioned or unrecognized. What originally drew me to these philosophers was my study of the history of feminism, specifically British and American nineteenth-century feminism. The nineteenth century in these countries is often depicted as one of activism rather than theorizing. Much of the writing about the history of feminism at this time in the United States and the United Kingdom has focused on the activist work of figures such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Emmeline Pankhurst. Perhaps this is how it should be; after all, it was the political organizing of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that lead to material changes in women ’s social, political, and economic lives. Relatively speaking, compared to studies of the history of feminist activism, feminist philosophical work has been largely ignored. This neglect is unsurprising , given the tremendous achievements of the activists of this era. Similarly , general histories of nineteenth-century philosophy tend to be male dominated. Moreover, even though such general histories may discuss the feminist work of a canonical philosopher, such as John Stuart Mill, these 2 empowerment and interconnectivity histories tend to neglect the existence of feminist philosophers. However, as inheritors of the rights fought for by these activist foremothers, we now have the relative luxury to investigate the feminist philosophical work of the nineteenth century. Indeed, we can ask not just whether there were a few isolated philosophers who wrote on feminist issues, but whether there is an identifiable history of feminist philosophy. If such a feminist history of philosophy exists, we would need to determine its relation to ‘‘mainstream’’ or canonical history of philosophy. More important, we would need to ask about how we would decide who is to be included. In other words, we would need to ask how a history of feminist philosophy would be done. This then is my focus: what can be said about nineteenth-century British and American feminist philosophy? This, however, is not an easy task. Twenty- first-century feminist philosophy is no one thing, moreover, to apply modern definitions to works that existed prior to the conceptualization of the subject area ‘‘feminist philosophy’’ (or even feminism itself) will strike many as inexcusably anachronistic. But I think it is worth the risk of such accusations to claim that feminist philosophical thinking has deep historical roots. Even with a limited focus on Anglo-American works, feminist philosophy is not a monolithic theory; however, it is possible to offer a working definition that is both applicable to contemporary thought and suitable for an examination of nineteenth-century works. The fundamental distinction between contemporary feminist philosophy and mainstream philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition is that the former does not claim to search for knowledge solely for its own sake, but rather for the sake of a political goal: identification and elimination of the subordination of women. Here we are provided with our initial working definition for the examination of my chosen texts. As we shall see, the distinctive feature of nineteenth-century feminist philosophy will be what it has to offer its female contemporaries for their empowerment. We shall see that support for women’s suffrage or critiques of the social injustices faced by women will not be enough to identify a particular text or texts as specifically feminist philosophical work or a particular philosopher as a specifically feminist philosopher . It is important to understand that my conception of feminist philosophy requires nuance; it is an initial working definition that will be developed as my overall argument progresses. I recognize that there have been many valuable feminist readings of traditional texts that have sought understanding or clarification of the implications of these texts for women (either past or present) without any apparent goal introduction 3 of knowledge that will produce change (i...