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Chapter 1 1. Levine, “Financial Development.” In “Universal Banking,” Caroline Fohlin also identifies three types of services that banks and intermediaries provide: brokerage (matching investors and borrowers), qualitative asset transformation (altering the liquidity or maturity of financial claims), and portfolios (diversifying assets, especially those too expensive for a single investor). 2. See, for example, Greif, “Contract Enforceability”; Ensminger, Making a Market; Burns, Colonial Habits; Gay, Moneylenders; Finn, Character of Credit; Frank, Dutra’s World; and Olegario, Culture of Credit. 3. Specifically for Mexico, see Marichal, “Obstacles to Development,” and more generally for the entire colonial period, see Robinson and Acemoglu, Economic Origins. 4. There had been an earlier Banco do Brazil founded by King João when the Portuguese royal family exiled itself to its colonies during the Napoleonic Wars, but this bank was more of a royal treasury, and it failed when João returned to Portugal in 1821, taking the bank assets with him. 5. The commercial code outlining specific bank charter regulations in 1884 and enforcing state supervision over these charters was crucial in the expansion of banks in Mexico ; see Maurer, Power and the Money. 6. Greif, “Contract Enforceability; Finn, Character of Credit; Wiemers, “Agriculture and Credit.” 7. Remmers, Henequen; Wells, “All in the Family”; Joseph and Wells, Summer of Discontent. 8. The importance of the distinction between market norms and social norms has been explored by Dan Ariely in Predictably Irrational. In chapter 4, Ariely discusses an experiment that neatly outlines the difference between the world of social norms (where behavior is modeled according to reputation and socially constructed parameters) or market norms (which are structured around material incentives). 9. On informal relations in markets, see Bell, Srinivasan, and Udry, “Interlinking Credit Markets”; Besley and Levenson, “Role of Informal Finance”; Levenson and Maloney , “Informal Sector”; MacMillan and Woodruff, “Interfirm Relationships”; Roberts, “Informal Economy”; and Sudhanshu and Claremont, “Economics of Rotating Savings.” A very small sample of the scholarship studying informal mechanisms of credit distribution includes Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, Priceless Markets; Bottin, Jeannin, and Pelus, Marchands d’Europe; Francesca, “Merchants and Money”; Lemercier, Un si discret pouvoir; Lemercier, “L’institution et le groupe”; Guinnane, “Cooperatives”; Granovetter, “Strength of Weak Ties”; Franklin and McKinnon, Relative Values; and Botticini, “Tale of ‘Benevolent’ Governments.” 10. In First Men of Cajamarca, James Lockhart pioneered work using native language documents, primarily notarial contracts, and so began a long scholarly tradition of using Notes 136 NOTES their documentation. Robert Patch, in Maya and Spaniard, and Terry Rugeley, in Maya Wars, Wonders and Wise Men, and Yucatán’s Maya Peasantry, have taken different and very successful approaches with similar native- and Spanish-language sources in Yucatán, as have other scholars of Latin America, especially Bert Jude Barickman, in Bahian Counterpoint , and Muriel Nazzari, in Disappearance of the Dowry, for Brazil. European scholars have also relied on the records of notaries for similar purposes. 11. Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment, 21. 12. For example, pawnshops, one of the oldest operating short-term credit providers, did not stop during the independence wars or the revolution; see François, Culture of Everyday Credit. 13. Marichal, Las inversiones extranjeras; François, Culture of Everyday Credit. 14. See Wiemers, “Agriculture and Credit,” and Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment. 15. See Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, Priceless Markets. 16. Triner, Banking and Economic Development; Musacchio, Experiments in Financial Democracy ; Ludlow and Marichal, Banca y poder; Haber, “Industrial Concentration,” “Financial Markets”; Del Ángel-Mobarak, Paradoxes of Financial Development; Maurer, Power and the Money. 17. Haber, “Industrial Concentration.” 18. Marichal, Las inversiones extranjeras; Marichal, “Obstacles to Development.” 19. Cerutti and Marichal, La banca regional. 20. Hanley, Native Capital; Sweigart, “Brazilian Export Agriculture”; Ridings, Business Interest Groups. 21. Von Wobeser, El crédito eclesiástico; Brading, Miners and Merchants; Florescano and Gil Sánchez, Época del las reformas. 22. Van Young, Hacienda and Market; Greenow, Credit and Socioeconomic Change. 23. Tenenbaum, Politics of Penury; Chowning, Wealth and Power; Van Young, Mexican Regions. 24. Wasserman, Capitalists, Caciques, and Revolution; Walker, Kinship, Business, and Politics ; Saragoza, Monterrey Elite. 25. For recent analysis of the role of kinship and insider networks and the effects of the colonial legacy on economic development, see Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment; Maurer, Power and the Money; Haber, Crony Capitalism; Haber, Razo, and Maurer, Politics of Property Rights; Robinson and Acemoglu, “Economic Backwardness”; and Robinson and Acemoglu, Economic Origins. 26. Granovetter, “Strength of Weak Ties.” Also see Lynne Zucker’s approach to trust in nonkin...

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