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The Mexican political system that took root during the twentieth century, following the Mexican Revolution, was built on dual pillars , of both centralized formal power in the state and a diffuse network of informal power built on patronage politics. National political leaders guaranteed the stability of the government by co-opting power centers outside the state that threatened its existence and by creating a set of clear channels for resolving conflicts among competing regional and local leaders. Based on a single hegemonic party, Mexico’s political system became one of the most durable in Latin America , largely because it achieved a set of shared understandings among competing political leaders and groups and their successful incorporation into a web of informal power through which state functions were exercised. The state centralized formal power in the national government, but left considerable decision-making ability to local political leaders, who served as intermediaries for citizens in return for their loyalty to the official party. Even state programs—from education to social welfare—were often delivered through these chains of intermediation rather than by the federal government itself (or through a combination of both public and private intermediation). Within this context, municipal governments were quite weak. They comprised a minimal percentage of all public expenditures and depended on highly discretionary investments of resources from the federal and state governments. However, municipal governments were frequently important arenas for the negotiation of demands and the delivery of services, even if many of these had to be coordinated with federal and state authorities.1 Mayoral candidacies were 7 Pathways of Democratic Change 1. This conclusion contrasts somewhat with Grindle, Going Local, 34–35, who suggests that municipalities were largely irrelevant before 1994. eagerly sought after as stepping-stones in a political career (or as recognition after a long career of service to the party), but mayors and municipal council members were hardly alone as political intermediaries in municipalities. Party leaders inside and outside of government, including members of Congress, union officials, delegates of federal and state agencies, and influential personalities within the PRI’s sectors, all functioned as intermediaries who played a role in maintaining the control by the official party. Although this was an authoritarian system, it did have mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability built in, sinceeffectiveintermediarieshadtodelivergoodstotheirconstituentsandcould lose influence if they did not.2 Local mobilizations often succeeded in ensuring greater responsiveness and accountability, as long as they did not question the system itself. Changes in the past two decades have sharply transformed the Mexican state and its relationship with citizens. The dual processes of democratization and decentralizationhavemadecompetitiveelectionscommonthroughoutthecountry while also devolving a significant amount of formal power to local and state governments. These twin processes have generated a form of “democracy close to home” that, in many ways, differs substantially from the authoritarian centralism of earlier decades. Gone are the days of a single hegemonic party. This study confirms that municipal elections are largely perceived as free and fair (though not without some flaws). Most municipalities have experienced alternation of the parties in power, and almost all have more than one party that competes regularly with a real chance at winning.3 Moreover, municipalities have regained a degreeofauthorityandautonomythattheyhavenothadfordecades.Theycomprise almost one-tenth of all public expenditures (up from 1 to 2 percent in the early 1980s) and have much more stable sources of income than in previous decades. Municipalities now receive transfers according to more or less consistent formulas, and for urban municipalities, property taxes and other local fiscal revenues have grown considerably. Municipalities have even begun to develop 164 Conclusions 2. Jonathan Fox argues that accountability mechanisms exist even in authoritarian political systems. For a highly nuanced discussion of this in rural Mexico, see Fox, Accountability Politics. 3. See the evidence presented in chapter 3 that most municipalities are sites of significant electoral competition. Grindle, in Going Local, notes that even where the PRI remains dominant, other parties almost always compete actively. Electoral rules in Mexico, of course, continue to be contested, and several local elections, including the 2003 and 2006 elections in Baja California, have ended up in the electoral courts. Even the 2006 presidential election was the subject of considerable debate regarding the fairness of the process; however, for the most part, local elections now take place without the kind of conflict that was common in the 1990s. [3.145.111.125] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 10:36 GMT) greater capacities for managing their responsibilities, although with Mexico’s no-reelection rule...

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