The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat's View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece

Part Nine: The Countercoup

Nine THE COUNTERCOUP PLANNING THE KING’S COUP On November 14 a childhood friend from Salonika, Argini Goutos, and her husband, Michael, arranged a meeting for me at their house in Kifissia with George Mavros, the leading Center Union party personality then still in circulation (George Papandreou had been almost continuously under house arrest since the coup). Others present that evening were my wife, Louise, Mrs. Mavros, and Bruce Lansdale. The following morning, November 15, I wrote a three-page ‘‘memorandum of conversation’’ reporting the substance of George Mavros’s remarks (with copies to the ambassador, the DCM, the economic counselor, and, in Washington, Dan Brewster and Charilaos Lagoudakis). It is appropriate to mention at this point that this was precisely four weeks prior to December 13, 1967, the date on which King Constantine launched his countercoup against the Papadopoulos junta. Mavros ‘‘has a fairly specific action plan,’’ my report began, for extricating the country from its present political difficulties. The king would play the key role by getting the government back into his own hands and then installing a transitional government. According to Mavros’s plan, the king (having gotten his family out of the country) would go to Salonika with Prime Minister Kollias on December 13 (he was specific as to the date), would there rally the Army commanders in the north to his side. On presentation to the government of the Mitrelias draft constitution, the king would announce to the country that he had accepted the resignation of the Kollias government. The Pattakos-Papadopoulos-Makarezos crowd would have no choice but to capitulate to the king’s action, for they are aware that most of Greece’s military strength is in the north and would side with the king if they tried to make an issue of it. If they tried to hold out, they could not do so for long. In his announcement the king would thank the coup group for their services to the country but would declare that their task had been completed with the submission of the new constitution. He would also declare a general amnesty for all people connected with the coup and for all of their victims (people imprisoned as a result of the coup). According to Mavros’s plan the king would then install a royalist military government made up of the most senior generals who have been retired in recent years, before and after the coup, and who have had no connection with the coup (he mentioned several names including Gennimatas). This group would rule for a certain length of time, maintaining martial law, press censorship, and the present restrictions on civil liberties. When the time was ripe the king would replace the military government with a civilian all-party government made up of outstanding people, both politicians and able non-politicians, including Karamanlis, Kanellopoulos, George Papandreou, in other words, all prominent Greeks willing to serve their country. This transition government would stay in power for a while and would prepare the country for a return to elections. On the question of elections, Mavros thinks a drastic reform is needed so that able people will be willing to enter politics without having to indulge in the normal, dirty politicking that the old Greek system required. He outlined a scheme under which the people would simply vote for a party list, and each such list would be headed up by 25 or 30 people of high intellectual caliber and moral stature who would be assured of election because of their positions high on the list and would thus not have to indulge in vote-buying, succumbing to special interests, and corruption to get elected. Mavros said that the Americans should play a role in all this by giving the king their full support, both now to encourage him to act as set forth above and at the time the king dismissed the present government. Mavros said that he and a large group of prominent planning the king’s coup 147 people are actively pushing this plan and urging it on the king. He assumes that the junta is aware of this effort but feels they cannot do much to stop it, since the people involved are too numerous and too prominent and are not plotting to overthrow the government but only to have it replaced. (This seems a somewhat subtle distinction for the likes...