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An environmentalist friend recently spoke with me at length about how the looming threat of global climate change is closer than we think. His discussion of global warming included some pretty dire predictions of aquifers drying up, massive desertification, and eventual global famine—all in an alarmingly brief time frame. Of course, I am familiar with global warming and know of its likely consequences, but this new information was even worse than I had imagined. Thoroughly panicked, I asked him what else I should be afraid of. What about acid rain? Should we add acid rain to the list of imminent apocalyptic plagues? We both sat quietly for a moment, he in contemplation and me in dread. Finally, he answered, somewhat bewilderedly, “I don’t know what happened to acid rain.” Shocked, I responded, “Me either.” Acid rain was perhaps the most salient and scary environmental threat in the 1980s. When factories discharge pollutants into the atmosphere, especially sulfur dioxide, the result is increased acidic levels in precipitation. Acid rain kills fish, plants, and animals, causes cancer in humans, and is known to melt away gravestones and statues. This is not the kind of drizzle that makes you want to go singing in the rain. Acid rain is also an international environmental issue that has no respect for boundaries on a map. For example, about 50 percent of the acid deposits in Canada come from the United States, and pollution in the UK has destroyed large swaths of forest in Sweden.1 During the 1980s, acid rain seemed to dominate the environmental news. I was particularly attuned to the issue because I lived in the always-rainy Pacific Northwest and was convinced that acid rain would soon melt my umbrella. So there we sat, my friend the expert on all things environmental, and me the erstwhile-concerned citizen and periodic environmentalist, both trying conclusion 1. Alm, “Acid Rain Policy,” 353. to recall what had become of acid rain. Was the problem solved? Had it been overblown to begin with? Are there currently news stories on acid rain that we are missing? If acid rain is still wreaking havoc, is someone covering up the problem? We just didn’t know. Yet acid rain was certainly salient to me back in the 1980s, as it was for a large number of Americans. Moreover, I was part of the 80 percent of Americans who felt that restrictions on sulfur dioxide emissions were necessary to curb acid rain, even if that meant I would pay higher electric bills.2 Given this political context of high issue salience and unified preferences, it is of little surprise that President George H. W. Bush acted to limit the emissions of sulfur dioxide in the United States by signing the Clean Air Act of 1990. But for me, what happened next is a mystery. My interest in acid rain abruptly ended with the last stroke of Bush’s pen—the Clean Air Act solved the problem, didn’t it?—and thus began my admittedly all-too-episodic concern with global warming. Indeed, for almost two decades, acid rain was relegated to the foggy recesses of my mind, only to be suddenly called forth by a conversation with my environmentalist friend. The point of this story is that issue salience rises and falls in ways that are predictable. The simple fact is that Americans find some aspects of foreign policy inherently interesting and other aspects insufferably boring. When we, the American public, are attentive to foreign affairs, presidents have good reason to listen to our opinions, especially if the public is of one mind. However, when we turn our attention elsewhere—usually ignoring those devilish little details of politics that seem dull yet are so very important—there is little reason for presidents to care what we think. In short, the regular ebbs and flows of public attention affect foreign policy making in deep and meaningful ways. The Theory and Evidence: A Recap This book offers a theory of conditional political responsiveness to examine when presidents lead, follow, or simply ignore the American public.The model is based on five simple propositions. First, presidents make a number of choices during a foreign policy event that may be influenced by public opinion. By conceptualizing foreign policy making as a five-stage process consisting of problem definition, option generation, policy decision, implementation, and policy 204 paying attention to foreign affairs 2. Survey by ABC News/Washington Post...

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