Can Globalization Promote Human Rights?

6. Global Human Rights Governance

6 global human rights governance Human rights are frequently regarded only as dependent consequences of globalization: globalization affects human rights, but human rights do not affect globalization. Yet the principles, laws, and practices of global human rights governance independently affect both elite implementation of globalization and social action in favor of or against it. A major difference between the first and second great transformations is the existence the second time around of the international human rights regime and the international human rights social movement. The concept of human rights has leapfrogged across time and space. While the ideals and laws of universal, individual human rights were introduced late in the evolution of Western capitalism, they were already part of the international scene before many of the world’s poorer countries started to develop; thus, they leaped chronologically from early to late capitalism. Moreover, although the principle of human rights was first formally articulated in the Western world, it is now relevant everywhere; in that sense, it has leaped geographically over oceans and seas to affect domestic policy in nearly every country. From almost universal human rights lawlessness, global governance has evolved to universal human rights law. The principles supported by human rights laws have strong normative value, even when states attempt to sidestep them or ignore the very human rights treaties they sign. Human rights obligations are 84 can globalization promote human rights? increasingly imposed on international organizations (IOs) and private corporate actors as well as states, although they are not yet strong enough to seriously constrain their behavior. western development and human rights lawlessness The happy predictions made in figure 4.1, the optimistic ideal-type model of the second great transformation, rely on similarities to the social evolution of western Europe, North America, and parts of East Asia. Such similarities do not necessarily suggest an easy or inevitable transition of the rest of the world to wealthy, democratic, and rights-respecting societies, however. Formerly colonized countries do not have access to one of the most important economic advantages the West had during its own period of capitalist growth: namely, human rights lawlessness. Governments and employers were, by and large, not concerned about the rights of citizens and workers, nor were they concerned about the rights of those inhabiting the worlds they conquered. Uninhibited by human rights considerations, they could act entirely for their own economic benefit. During the West’s period of growth, no international law prevented the purchase or theft of people. Enslavement was a normal activity of the precapitalist and early capitalist periods; indeed, international law did not officially abolish slavery until 1926 (League of Nations 1926). Furthermore , no international law prohibited colonialism until 1960 (Du Plessis 2003, 657; Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2006, 45–47). Colonial conquest was a common practice inherited from the ancient world; it permitted Europeans to take over territories previously not part of the world economy and curtail or distort their economies as they saw fit. During the period of Western expansion, moreover, there were no laws against massive population transfers. The ordinary inhabitants of Europe had few rights. Their governments could deport them to the colonies if they disobeyed the myriad laws that regulated their behavior, or deprive them of the lands they traditionally owned, as in the enclosure global human rights governance 85 movement. Similarly, no international law prohibited ethnic cleansing or—until 1948—genocide (United Nations General Assembly [1948] 2006). Although some Catholic missionaries protested the maltreatment of aboriginal populations in the Americas, by and large colonists could do as they pleased to wipe out the “primitive” populations occupying territories they sought (Jones 2006, 70–76). None of these economic advantages of human rights lawlessness, however, assured the prosperity of the Western world. Not all slavetrading states become equally wealthy, as Portugal demonstrates: an early slave-trading power, it fell behind other European states in the competition for economic growth. Nor did all colonial powers prosper equally; despite Spain’s early colonization of the Americas, in economic growth it lagged far behind Britain, France, and several other countries that did not possess colonies (Wallerstein 1980, 179–85). The sorts of social changes diagramed in figure 4.1 were far more important to Western capitalist development than the slave trade or colonialism. Internal changes in habits, laws, entrepreneurial activities, and relations among social groups were necessary determinants of capitalist growth. Moreover , while many states, capitalists, and ruling...