Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation

6. Deliberative Democracy and its Critics

The empirical evidence indicates that the process of empathy is necessary if deliberative democracy is going to function as conceived in the core deliberative theories. Without empathizing citizens, deliberative democracy will likely be no more than a talkative form of aggregative democracy. Yet there is an alternative, further-reaching conclusion suggested by this evidence: constructing a theory of deliberative democracy with the process model of empathy in view requires a shift in our thinking about the purpose of deliberation and its connection to democratic legitimacy. Deliberation is necessary to move closer to a more equal consideration of all citizens in a democratic society, and it can serve as a necessary component of democratic legitimacy, but only if we no longer conceive of deliberation as focused solely on argumentation and justiWcation. In order to demonstrate this, I will examine how the process model of empathy can help deliberative theory respond to the challenges raised by its critics in novel ways that strengthen the persuasiveness of the deliberative model. Such an approach makes clear that we must alter or reject some of the positions previous deliberative theorists have taken on the issues of rationality and the forms of legitimate communication in deliberation, legitimacy and the role of consent in democracy, and inclusion and the path toward impartiality in democratic judgment. A¤ect, Cognition, and Reason As I have already noted, one of the primary criticisms of deliberative theories is that they misconceive the relationships among a¤ect, cognition, and reason. Political psychologists and political theorists argue that deliberative 6 deliberative democracy and its critics theorists inaccurately conceive of reason as a cognitive process that is or should be generally a¤ect-free. Although speaking about evaluations of candidates , David Redlawsk sums up this position nicely: “Political scientists who prefer voters as a¤ect-free calculators who coolly consider candidates and make even-handed evaluations if simply given enough information miss a critical piece of the puzzle. A¤ect counts. We can no more process political information without being aware of how it makes us feel than we can make reasoned candidate choices with no information at all” (2002, 1041). While some deliberative theorists have shown a greater openness to a¤ect, we still must clarify the import of integrating a¤ect, cognition, and reason in deliberation. The process model can assist us in doing so. The Centrality of A¤ect in Political Reasoning In Chapter 1 I highlighted the two most prominent theories in political psychology that address the relationships among a¤ect, cognition, and reason in political judgment. The a¤ective intelligence theory (Marcus 2000, 2002, 2003; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Wolak and Marcus 2007) posits that two brain systems constantly monitor stimuli: the disposition and surveillance systems. The disposition system evaluates behavior to determine its success and is central to the formation of habits. Over a period of time the disposition system marks stimuli and situations in such a way that it can provide feedback on our habitual behavior. When we encounter familiar sensory input for which the disposition system has already determined the appropriate response, it monitors our behavior and responds with positive or negative feedback. We rely upon these habitual responses in order to function, and they apply to politics just as to other inputs: “We rely on proven habits to decide whether to listen to political rhetoric or dismiss it, to react warmly or coldly to political appeal” (Marcus 2002, 72). The disposition system relies upon an a¤ective marker in its functioning, and the most prominent is enthusiasm. Successful behaviors elicit enthusiasm , but so too does the appearance of political objects that the disposition system connects with positive habits. In contrast, the disposition system reacts by dampening down enthusiasm for unsuccessful behaviors, and can even react with anger or loathing in the presence of political objects that it assesses negatively. A political “friend” can release positive feelings and enthusiasm, a political “enemy” negative feelings and even anger. The surveillance system, in contrast, monitors our current plan of action with an eye toward the expected outcome in the environment, and compares 130 empathy and democracy those expectations with the input from the sensory streams entering the brain. If there is some discord between expectations and environment, the surveillance system interrupts ongoing behavior and shifts awareness to that which is novel or threatening in the environment. It leads us to take account of our environment...