Reactions to the Market: Small Farmers in the Economic Reshaping of Nicaragua, Cuba, Russia, and China

Postscript

Postscript Yet another period of change was initiated in Nicaragua and Cuba in the mid-s. In Nicaragua, the reelection of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to the presidency in late  and Daniel Ortega’s assumption of that position in early  opened the way for change. In Cuba, the serious illness of Fidel Castro, which was made public in mid-, and the election of Raul Castro to the presidency in February  signaled this change. The return of the Sandinistas to power, albeit in the context of a much more divided left than had been the case in the s, created the possibility of a renewed alliance between these two governments. This alliance was rejuvenated under the auspices of a recently formed regional alliance, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America (ALBA), which had been established following the election of Hugo Chávez to the presidency of Venezuela in . With the Cold War over and Venezuelan oil reserves as fuel, ALBA offered (at least in theory) the new Sandinista government and that of Raul Castro a distinct context for policy making than what had come before. In Nicaragua, the new Sandinista government sketched out a set of priorities and means to achieve them that represented a strong contrast with the overall economic—and especially agrarian—policies of the previous sixteen years of neoliberal governing, in the form of the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, – (National Plan for Human Development, –). Among the elements of contrast were its prioritization of food crop produc-      tion and its support for small- and medium-sized producers. The former of these priorities was supposed to reduce Nicaragua’s dependence on food imports—and increase its food sovereignty (as defined in Chapter )—as well as to diminish rural poverty.1 How exactly did Daniel Ortega’s government propose to go about putting these priorities into practice? Although land redistribution was not in its initial tool kit (GRUN ; Interview, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry , July , ), every effort was to be made to ensure that small- and medium-sized producers would not be forced to give up any more of their land. The need for foreign investment and participation by the private sector in the economy ruled out taking away land from the landed, either by the state or through land occupations, to redistribute to the landless and the land-poor. But, even within this ‘‘ambiance of the market,’’ several things were working in the government’s favor: the worldwide food crisis and the discourse of civil society promotion (Interview, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, July , ). Nicaragua was especially hard hit by the food crisis of the mid-s, which coincided with a major increase in fuel prices, another imported item. Given its heavy dependence on imported foodstuffs (a situation particularly fostered by the emphasis on exports at the expense of food crop production inherent in the neoliberal economic policies of the s and the first half of the s), the country was vulnerable.2 This desperate state of affairs pointed to promoting food crop production and those who engaged in it, especially in light of the call for these priorities from within organizations that composed civil society. The means by which the Sandinista government planned to fortify the position of small- and medium-sized producers included expanding statesupplied credit for this sector. With funds from ALBA, in  the government provided  percent more rural credit targeting small producers in particular than had been offered the previous year; and the indications were good that this upward trajectory would continue in  (SPAR , ). Yet another government program—‘‘Hambre Cero’’ (Zero Hunger)— distributed a package of goods, including a pregnant cow, a pregnant pig, chickens and a rooster, feed and seeds for feed for them, fruit and other trees, construction materials for a stable, and training in a variety of areas designed . This logic coincides with that set forth by Kay (). . For example, the country imported approximately  percent of the rice its population consumed, the price of which soared to new heights in the world market during this period (Dickerson ).   to make their production viable.3 In the first eighteen months of the program, almost , families had received partial or complete packages (bonos) from the government (SPAR , ).4 Technical assistance was also to be provided to small farmers by the state once again. In the first year of Sandinista governing (), the number of those receiving this service nearly doubled, and this pattern...