-
4. The Solidarity Collective
- Penn State University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
F o u r The Solidary Collective Solidarity is a moral relation that creates a unity among peoples, but how does that unity come about and what is the precise nature of the unity that distinguishes solidarity from “community,” “society,” “organization,” “association ,” or “party”? Ontologically and morally, the solidary group differs from these others and some might even question its status as a group altogether. I argue that we can continue to call that which forms for political solidarity a group or collective in spite of the fact that it does not resemble other types of groups united around a common identity, shared attribute, common history, or communal experience. Solidarity may be counted among the forms of collective action but each individualmakesapersonalcommitment;solidarity,asamoralconcept, includes prescriptions for both individual and collective moral action. Among these commitments is the moral relationship with others and the duties entailed in that relationship. I discussed the moral aspects of that relationship in the previous chapter. The social and ontological aspects of the relations that form the solidary group are worth pausing to consider here. Interest in voluntary associations , cosmopolitanism, civic participation, and solidarity is burgeoning in the philosophical literature, and with good reason. Globalization in business and entertainment, innovative global communication systems, gross international crises in human rights, transnational environmental hazards, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor around the world, among other international and global issues, all conspire to diminish or erase the importance of national borders for civic participation. Involvement in political life 114 Political Solidarity takes a new shape and addresses alternative dimensions of social existence, both new and old. The family, the club, the workplace, and the world itself become the loci for politics. Coupled with this is an ever-increasing confidence in the power of collective action to bring about social and structural change. Political solidarity, which arguably has been present and active in social arrangements for centuries, becomes recognized as a powerful tool for political involvement as well as a worthy topic of study for scholars as one of the many forms of voluntary association through which an individual both shapes him- or herself and contributes to the shaping of society. In this chapter, I examine what it means to call political solidarity a voluntary association or, more precisely, a form of collective action, by focusing on the group itself. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section discusses how a solidary group differs from other types of groups. With particular attention to the moral differences, I compare and contrast the solidary group with other groups common in social activism or social change, namely, organizations, associations, parties, collectives, and communities. I also distinguish solidarity from society. The theory of political solidarity, as a political or social theory, does not aim at constructing a society and ought not to be confused with those types of social and political theory that set out to articulate the just society, such as social contract theory. The second section examines the relation between the solidary group and the oppressed group. As I have already intimated, these groups are distinct, though their membership may overlap. Most articulations of solidarity conflate these two groups (and for rather compelling reasons), but, as I will show, there are both moral and ontological reasons for understanding them as separate and distinct. Social and political activism to bring about social change rarely occurs in isolated pockets. Activists are often involved in multiple causes and their efforts at times overlap and at other times contradict. The third section of this chapter offers some consideration of the moral issues that arise when political solidarities interconnect, overlap, and contradict. The final section of the chapter considers the relationship between democracy and solidarity by looking at decision-making within solidarity activity and the solidary group. I bypass the larger question of whether participation in political solidarity is a form of civic participation because I presume that it is. I also presume that such activity is a right of democratic societies and indeed a human right. Michael Walzer is correct when he says that “in a democratic society, action-in-common is better than withdrawal and solitude, tumult is [107.21.137.184] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 10:58 GMT) 115 The Solidary Collective better than passivity, shared purposes (even when we don’t approve) are better than private listlessness” (1994, 188–89). Instead of arguing that political solidarity is a constituent part of democracy, I look...