Political Solidarity

3. The Moral Relations and Obligations of Political Solidarity

THREE The Moral Relations and Obligations of Political Solidarity Starting a social movement is no easy task. Often what appears as a spontaneous social movement has been decades in the making. The different commitments of the members of the solidary group account in part for the sustaining force of political solidarity. Some people will work diligently and systematically to chip away at what they perceive to be a system of oppression or injustice. Others will suddenly find themselves united by a passion for a cause or incensed by a current injustice. The unity that forms among actors might be close-knit and coherent or quite amorphous and fluid. Regardless of the diversity of commitments linking individual members and the power of the bond of the collective, political solidarity makes certain requirements on the participants. The content of the social movement will, of course, provide many of the specifics of these requirements, but the structure and purpose of political solidarity itself (as opposed to social and civic solidarity) reveal the outlines of the moral relationships and obligations that will be filled within the context of a particular injustice. This chapter examines the initial commitment to political solidarity and the moral relationships that form, as well as the requirements of those relationships. What I paint here in the broad brushstrokes of an outline receive their vivid colors within the particular social movements, contexts of injustice, and struggles against oppression. 72 Political Solidarity An Individual’s Commitment to Activity in Solidarity How any particular individual gets involved in a social movement entails, at some moment, an active commitment. I say “active commitment” rather than conscious choice because there may in fact not be a conscious decision to become involved in a social movement. A commitment usually but not necessarily involves conscious choice, but we must be careful not to ascribe undue weight to rational decision-making within political solidarity. Certainly rational decision-making plays a role, and may play a primary role for some participants , but others will be compelled to commit due to other factors. Political solidarity may be motivated by any number of factors, such as feelings of indignation, experiences of oppression or injustice, desire to care for others who are suffering, or even employment situations. Those who join in solidarity may convince others to be similarly stimulated to act by the force of their arguments or feelings. When injustice or oppression is recognized as such or when they reach an utterly intolerable level, the compulsion to respond can become quite forceful. That is why political solidarity often looks more or less spontaneous. Consider the Polish Solidarity movement for instance. More often than not, the events of August 1980 are used to mark the start of the movement, but Goodwyn (1991) offers compelling evidence that the movement can be traced back to the immediate post–World War II era. Indeed, Goodwyn challenges the notion that movements are spontaneous at all. The vague beginnings, he argues, are often obscured once the movement has momentum. Similarly, the movements for civil rights and women’s liberation were decades—even centuries—in the making. But some movements really are spontaneous and the force of the collective passion carries the movement forward. Political solidarity is a moral relation of a social movement that unites­ individuals because of their shared commitment to a cause or goal. While political organizations and other formal advocacy associations may share with solidarity many of the same structures and duties, there are some significant differences. The moral duties within formally organized political associations are better understood under the rubric of social or civic solidarity as they usually pertain to group cohesion or civic obligations. But perhaps more interesting is that because political solidarity entails a number of individuals collectively making personal commitments to a cause, a number of relations 73 The Moral Relations and Obligations of Political Solidarity are presumed in the moral relation of political solidarity itself. A commitment to a cause ­establishes voluntary relations and obligations to that cause. The commitment is a sort of agreement to act in such a way that the pursuit of the cause or goal informs one’s actions. But the commitment also informs other relations. A commitment to solidarity sets up a collective—a group that acts together, in concert, simultaneously, or consistently. Any individual who willingly takes on the commitment to solidarity also takes on a relation to others who similarly...