Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life: Feminist Wittgensteinian Metaethics

Index

index absolutism: conventionalism and, 21–22; foundationalism and, 83–84; Harman’s discussion of, 149–53; metaethics and, 3–4; moral relativism and, 139–42; normativity and, 53–55; stability and, 14–15; Wittgenstein’s discussion of, 7–11. See also moral fact Ackermann, Robert, 73 acknowledgment of morality: justification and, 127–31; limits of, 131–34; recognition and, 124–27 action, moral epistemology and, 115–17 agency: acknowledgment and recognition and, 125–27; antirealist-realist debate and, 44–45; felted contextualism of, 62–63; moral epistemology and, 115–17 agreement: examples of, 105–12; as morality source, 140–42; normativity and, 100– 103; understanding and, 122–24 alienation and isolation, metaethics and, 8–11 Anglo-American philosophy, ethics in, 3 Annas, Julie, 26n.9, 118–19 antirealist/realist debates: moral epistemology and, 115–17; moral properties and, 23–41; naturalism and, 43–60; normativity and, 15–18; world/language dichotomy and, 47–53 arbitrariness of grammar, 92–95 architecture: felted contextualism metaphor and, 62–63; metaethics and, 11–15 Aristotle, final cause theory of, 34–37 attitudes, disagreements in, 143–46 Authority of Reason, The, 33–37 autonomous ethics, Harman’s concept of, 148–53 avowals, empirical statements vs., 129n.21 Ayer, A. J., 118–20 Baier, Annette, 2 Balmond, Cecil, 11–15 beliefs, disagreements in, 142–46 Bledsoe, Albert Taylor, 134n.29 Blue Book, 23 bodies: moral acknowledgment and recognition and role of, 125–27; Wittgenstein’s discussion of, 66–69 Brink, David, 3, 138 Bush Administration, 166–67 Cartesian ego: moral acknowledgment and recognition and, 124–27; Wittgenstein’s language theory and, 65–69 Cartesian epistemology, 78–84 Categorical Imperative, 117 Catholic Church, fundamentalism and, 138–39 causality: in beliefs and attitudes, 144–46; justification and, 128–31; naturalism and, 50–53; normative authority of grammar and, 103–5; objectivity and, 32–33 certainty theory: metaethics and, xi–xiii; stability and, 85–87; Wittgenstein’s critique of, 78–84 Christian Coalition, 140n.7 cognitive science: ethics and, 39–41; feminist ethics and, 2 community: certainty and stability and, 85–87; normative authority and, 158n.45; Stroll’s discussion of, 83–84 computers, understanding in, 127n.18 context, absolutism vs. relativism and, 151–53 contingency: examples of, 105–12; Wittgenstein ’s discussion of, 19 conventionalism: grammar agreement and stability and, 100–103; world/language dichotomy and, 47–53 correctness: grammar and standard of, 89–91; standard of, 51–53 counting, as normativity example, 106–7 culture, conventionalism and role of, 48–60 ‘‘Defense of Common Sense, A,’’ 78–84 depravity, Sturgeon’s discussion of, 30–32 174 index Descartes, René, 9; epistemology of, 79–84; influence in architecture of, 11–12 Diamond, Cora, 2, 56, 114 disagreement: ethics and, 142–46; morality and, 137–42 diversity thesis, arbitrariness of grammar and, 92–95 Douglass, Frederick, xiii, 21, 132–36, 168 dualism, Wittgenstein on body and, 67 Dummet, Michael, 100 Einstein, Albert, 97n.8, 147 emotions: form of life concept and, 72–74; nonarbitrariness of grammar and, 96–100 empirical facts: avowals and, 129n.21; moral epistemology and, 120n.12; moral facts vs., 37–38; nonarbitrariness of grammar and, 97–100 ends, justification and, 130–31 epistemology. See moral epistemology error theory (Mackie), moral values and, 23– 26, 38–41 Essay on Liberty and Freedom, An, 134n.29 essentialism, moral epistemology and, 116n.5 ethics: disagreement in, 142–46; naturalism and, 43–44 Ethics and Language, 142–46 Ethics (Mackie), 23 explanation, justification vs., 128–31 Facts and Value, 142–46 felted contextualism: antirealist/realist debates and, 17–18; dual character of grammar and, 92; heterogeneous stability and, 61–87; Hurricane Katrina response and, 159–68; internal relations of concepts and, 100; metaethics and, xii–xiii; moral agreement and disagreement and, 140–42; moral epistemology and, 116–17; normativity and, 19; objectivity and, 21–22, 156–58; stability and agreement in grammar and, 102–3 Feminist Morality, 4–5 feminist theory: disagreement and, 138–42; Hurricane Katrina response and, 164–68; language and, 65–69; metaethics and, xi–xiii, 1–6; moral epistemology and, 115–17 finitude, metaethics and concept of, 9–11 form of life concept: acknowledgment and recognition and, 125–27; felted contextualism of, 63–87; moral practices and, 17–18; multiple life forms and, 74–76; normativity and, 108–12; relationships between multiple forms, 76–78; Wittgenstein ’s language games concerning, 69–74 Forster, Michael, 92–100 foundational theory: certainty and, 78–79; form of life concept and, 76–78; metaethics...